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ABSTRACT 
 
We study, using the non-parametric data envelopment approach, we investigated the 
long-run profit efficiency dynamics and the short-run market reaction of nine pre-classified 
merger deals of merging and non-merging U.S. banks over the time period from 1992 to 2003. 
Our main results are as follows: First, merger deals that match least efficient acquirers with the 
least efficient targets could improve their profit efficiency four years following the merger event, 
unlike all other merger deals. Second, we find that  mergers match least efficient acquirers with 
the least efficient targets  could also achieve significant positive cumulative access returns 
(CARs) while all other deals were followed by significant negative  CARs. Third, we find that, 
in general, that large-size acquirers have and maintain higher and efficiency scores than targets 
and non-merging banks. Finally, the value-maximizing mergers are mostly large in size and 
match banks with clear chances to increase their future efficiency rankings. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The United States witnessed its fifth wave of banking industry consolidation during the 
1990s, according to Moeller et al. (2005).  This last consolidation wave was associated with 
“higher stock valuations, greater use of equity as a form of payment for mergers, and more 
takeover defenses in place than the merger wave of the 1980s.”  These changing merger 
characteristics were combined with serious wealth losses to acquiring firms’ stockholders.  
Moeller et al. indicate that acquiring firms’ stockholders lost as much as 50 times the amount 
they did in the 1980s ($216 billion in the 1990s versus $4 billion in the 1980s). 
The 1990s merger wave was motivated, in part, by regulatory reforms and technology 
changes. The two primary regulatory influences were the enactment of the 1994 Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act and the 1999 Graham-Leach-Bliley Act.  
Riegle-Neal removed the remaining geographic restrictions on branching.  However, it was not 
fully effective until June 1, 1997 (Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian, 2003).  The Graham-Leach-
Bliley Act repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 by allowing commercial banks to engage in 
other activities such as investment banking.1  The result of these regulatory changes was a surge 
in bank merger activity that sharply reduced the number of operating banks, but led to an 
increase in the total number of bank branches.  According to Berger, Delong, and DeYoung 
(2003), the merger wave of the second half of the 1990s produced the largest number and 
greatest value of banks acquired over any five-year period.  Wang (2003) indicates that, during 
the 1990s, the average size of banking organizations increased by more than 35%.  Some of these 
                                                 
1 Ely and Robinson (1998) argue that the passage of Glass-Steagall came as result of the stock market crash  
of 1929 when it was enacted within the Banking Act of 1933.  However, Glass-Steagall did not simply prohibit most 
banks from engaging in securities activities, but it also prohibited paying interest on demand deposits.  Glass-
Steagall remained active until the 1980s, when banks became more engaged in underwriting and dealing with U.S. 
government securities.  In 1987, banks were allowed, on a case-by-case basis, to engage in securities activities if the 
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mergers resulted in the emergence of banks with assets exceeding $50 billion.  The fact that the 
banking industry is getting more concentrated was acknowledged by the chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors, Alan Greenspan,2 who stated that, “If all the mergers that have 
been announced are completed, the ten largest banking organizations in the United States will 
account for about 51% of all domestic banking assets, almost double their share in 1995.  
Consolidation has not been a phenomenon involving only large banks.  Roughly 45% of the 
mergers involved an acquirer and a target each of which had less than one billion dollars in 
assets.” 
The existing literature proposes two main motives for consolidation: value-maximization 
motives and non-value maximization motives.  Value-maximization motives for mergers, 
according to Akhavein et al. (1997), include at least three possible motives. The first is 
increasing cost efficiency through improving economies of scale.  Akhavein et al. argue that 
consultants and managers are motivated more often by cost efficiency improvement than any 
other motive.  This argument is further supported by Rhoades (1997), who showed that the 
primary reason for the nine mergers in his study was to achieve higher cost efficiencies in the 
intermediate time horizon.  The second value-maximizing motive is profit efficiency 
improvement, which implicitly includes cost efficiency improvement.  The goal in this case is to 
increase revenues and to decrease costs simultaneously.  The third value-maximizing motive for 
bank mergers is the pursuit of market power in setting prices.  In this case, the merger is 
motivated by achieving higher market share. 
                                                                                                                                                             
volume of these activities did not exceed 5% of a bank’s total revenues.   In 1989, the percentage was raised to 10%.  
In 1997, forty-five banks representing 48% of all banking assets were allowed to engage in securities activities. 
2 Remarks by chairman Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, at the American Bankers Association 
Annual Convention, New York, New York, October 5, 2004. 
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Berger et al. (2000) supports the increasing market power motive.  Their findings show 
that 50% of merger and acquisition activities (M&A) were in-market mergers.  Akhavein et al. 
(1997) found that changes in prices after mergers are found to be very small and not statistically 
significant.  This result, according to Akhavein et al., is consistent with the hypothesis that 
antitrust policy has been successful in preventing mergers that would result in increased market 
power.  However, their findings show significant profit efficiency gains due to shifts in output 
from securities to loans.  Wang (2003) argues that antitrust policies were balanced enough to 
permit efficiency gains to be achieved through mergers, and regulators generally sanction 
mergers that can concretely achieve such potential.  Shafer (1993) shows that if the best practice 
banks acquired the least efficient banks, efficiency gains should be expected.  Berger and 
Humphrey (1992) find that, for the most part, acquiring banks tend to be more efficient than 
targets.  They argue that the acquirer needs sufficient time to improve the efficiency of the target. 
The non-value maximization motive, on the other hand, is represented by the free cash 
flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986).  According to Jensen, managers with access to a large surplus of 
cash tend to engage in value destroying investments (i.e., adding negative net present value 
projects to the investment portfolio of the bank) that diminish stockholders’ returns.  The free 
cash flow theory implies that acquirers with surplus cash will pay in cash for merger 
transactions, while acquirers with no surplus cash will use stock-for-stock deals.  If these 
explanations are accurate, the free cash flow hypothesis can explain both the motive of mergers 
and the method of payment to be used in merger transactions.  Myers and Majluf (1984) 
proposed the information asymmetry hypothesis to explain the method of payment used in 
merger deals.  According to this hypothesis, if the acquirer is more informed about the real value 
of the company than the general public, it will use cash if the bank is undervalued and will use 
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stock if the bank is overvalued.  Rhoades et al. (2004) argue that firms whose stocks are 
overvalued should use stock to buy firms, especially if the whole sector is overvalued. 
To understand the motivations behind mergers, researchers have examined the post-
merger performance of the acquirers and targets in two ways.  The first way is the operating 
performance approach, which analyzes changes in profit, cost, and other performance measures 
around a merger.  For example, Rhoades (1986, 1990), Spendt and Terhan (1991), Linder and 
Crane (1993), Peristiani (1993), and Rose (1987) indicate no performance improvement after a 
merger.  Cornett and Tehranian (1992), and more recently, Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian 
(2003), find an increase in post-merger operating performance, while Berger and Humphrey 
(1992), Piloff (1996), and Berger (1997) do not.  However, operating performance studies have 
two main weaknesses:  1) they use simple ratios that depend on accounting data; and 2) there are 
methodological problems with using performance ratios to measure cost and profit efficiencies 
because ratios do not control for differences in input prices and output mix.  
 Due in part to these weaknesses, the focus in the research has switched recently to 
another more comprehensive aspect of efficiency, X-efficiency (cost, revenue, and profit 
efficiencies). Unlike efficiency ratios, the frontier X-efficiency concerns a bank’s use of inputs.3  
Akhavein et al. (1997) argue that there are methodological problems with using performance 
ratios to measure cost and profit efficiencies because ratios do not control for differences in input 
prices and output mix.  Berger and Humphrey (1992) use the frontier efficiency methodology to 
show no cost efficiency improvement post-merger.  These findings are similar to those of 
Rhoades (1993), DeYoung (1996), and Akhavein et al. (1997), although Akhavein et al. find that 
merged banks experience a statistically significant 16% improvement in the profit efficiency of 
large banks, especially those with the lowest efficiency scores, before merger. 
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The second way of examining post-merger performance has been the event study method.  
These studies measure the reaction of the stock prices of acquirers and targets around a merger 
announcement.  Lobue (1984), Desai and Stover (1985), Pettway and Trifts (1985), and James 
and Wier (1987) find that acquiring and target banks have positive abnormal returns following a 
merger announcement.  Neely (1987) and Trifts and Scanlon (1988) find that the acquiring banks 
do not have abnormal returns for either intrastate or interstate merger proposals, although their 
findings show that targets experience positive significant abnormal returns in both cases.  In 
another study, Delong (2001) highlights the asymmetry of the value reduction and finds that a 
merger destroys value if the outcome results in activity and/or geographic diversification, and 
enhances value if it results in activity and/or geographic focusing.  Cornett and Tehranian (1992) 
compare the results of operating performance and event study methodologies.  Their findings 
show no improvement in efficiency ratios, but acquiring banks experience negative significant 
cumulative abnormal returns and targets experience positive significant cumulative abnormal 
returns.  Event studies also have problems which mainly come in two forms: 1) the period 
specification around merger announcements varies greatly from study to study, making it 
difficult to compare results; and 2) sample differences between studies and sampling errors 
within studies produce conflicting findings.  Recently, some studies have introduced the 
technique of sub-sampling the population of merging banks according to specific characteristics 
in order to overcome sampling effects. 
 This dissertation examines the wealth effects of bank mergers by distinguishing pair-
wise between efficiency types of mergers.  Specifically, each merger transaction is classified 
according to the efficiency of both acquirers and targets.  We argue that the market reaction will 
depend on two simultaneous pieces of information included in the merger announcement: 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 The frontier efficiency approach is discussed in detail in the methodology section. 
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1. The efficiency evaluation of each of the two parties engaged in a merger transaction 
before the merger is announced.  Most previous literature analyzed the market reaction to 
geographic diversification, in-market or vertical merger, etc.  We argue that all of the 
previous literature analyzed the means of efficiency, but missed the efficiency itself as a 
determinant of the combined bank’s future efficiency.  While there is voluminous 
literature concerned with the effect of the pre-merger efficiency scores on the post-
merger operating performance (e.g., Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Shafer, 1993; Rhoades, 
1997; and Rhoades et al., 2004), there are no studies on the market reaction to the 
acquirer and target efficiencies.  In this dissertation, we propose a unique match between 
the pre-merger operating efficiency scores of both the acquiring and target bank and the 
consequent market reaction. 
2. The method of payment used to accomplish a merger transaction can signal important 
information on the fair value of the acquiring firm under asymmetric information (Myers 
and Majluf 1994) and the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen 1986).   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2003) find that industry-adjusted operating performance 
of merged banks increases significantly after a merger.  Other results from their work include: 
large bank mergers produce greater performance gains than small bank mergers, activity 
focusing mergers produce greater performance gains than activity diversifying mergers, 
geographically focusing mergers produce greater performance gains than geographically 
diversifying mergers, and performance gains are larger after the implementation of full 
nationwide banking in 1997 via the Riegle-Neal Act.  Further, they find the improved 
performance is the result of both revenue enhancement and cost reduction activities.  
Additionally, the revenue enhancement opportunities appear to be greatest in those mergers that 
offer the most opportunity for cost cutting activities (i.e., activity focusing and geographically 
focusing mergers).  
By employing a pair of truncated regressions conditioned on managerial objectives, 
Gupta and Misra (2004) find that the marginal valuation impact of the relative size of the merger 
partners, the premium paid for target shares, and inter- versus intra-state transactions is 
asymmetric across deals made by good versus bad managers.  In particular, they document that 
in deals made by good (bad) managers, merger gains are increasing (decreasing) in the relative 
size of the transaction and in the premium paid for target shares.  The latter finding suggests that 
in bids made by good managers, the premium paid may serve as a signal of deal quality and yield 
larger value gains.  They also find that within the set of good mergers, interstate transactions 
have a negative impact on merger gains.  
DeYoung et al. (2004) provide a first step in a large research agenda by describing how 
the geography of the U.S. banking industry has changed in the 1990s in response to deregulation 
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and technological advancement.  They explore three facets of the geography of the banking 
industry:  headquarters location, branch office locations, and deposit collection.  They find that 
mergers and acquisitions have allowed banks to move their company headquarters from smaller 
cities to larger cities, consistent with the existence of agglomeration economies available to 
banking companies.  They also demonstrate that bank branches have moved substantially farther 
away from bank headquarters, evidence that banking organizations have become less 
geographically centralized.  
Bouwman (2004) attributes the holding of excess capital by banks to regulation.  He 
argues that if banks hold more capital, they impose a smaller threat on the deposit insurance 
fund, and hence, the regulator gives these banks more leeway and allows them to engage in more 
activities.  If they keep less capital, the regulator becomes more intrusive.  The area where this 
link between bank capital and regulation is most likely to manifest itself is mergers and 
acquisitions.  Acquisitions may change the risk profile of the acquirer in a way that is 
unacceptable to the regulator.  Given that the regulator must grant approval for an acquisition, 
she may be inclined to approve acquisitions when acquirers are well capitalized.  This suggests a 
link between the level of capital of the acquirer and the types of acquisitions undertaken, and 
hence the post-acquisition performance of the acquirer.  Bouwman (2004) builds a simple 
theoretical model based on this link, which establishes testable predictions regarding the 
relationship between acquirer capitalization and post-merger performance.  In a model extension, 
he examines how concentrated ownership impacts this relationship.  He finds that at the time of 
the announcement, the market believes that capitalization is irrelevant.  However, consistent with 
his model, he finds that highly capitalized acquirers show the worst performance in the long run, 
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and they consistently underperform acquirers with lower capitalizations.  This result holds 
regardless of the method used to estimate abnormal returns.  
Consistent with the model proposed by DeYoung, Hunter, and Undell (2003), Carter and 
McNulty (2004) find that, after controlling for market concentration, cost of funds, and a variety 
of other factors that might influence yields, smaller banks perform better that larger banks in the 
business lending market.  This result is not due to differences in the composition of business loan 
portfolios at small and large banks since the ratio of small business loans to total business loans 
is held constant throughout their analysis.    
Elyasiani and Deng (2004) study the value and risk effects of diversification.  They find 
that asset diversification, international diversification, and banking activity diversification lead to 
reductions in bank returns.  The negative impact of diversification on bank returns is consistent 
with the so-called consensus of value reduction in corporate finance.  They also find that all three 
methods of diversification lead to an increase in bank risk and a reduction in the equity-to-asset 
ratio.  The finding is consistent with the view that deviations from core competencies will result 
in increased risk and also with the view that increased distance between headquarters and 
branches magnify agency problems and their consequences.  This finding is also consistent with 
empirical findings of Demsetz and Strahan (1997) and Stiroh (2002). 
Rose (1987) finds that the operating performance of merging banks as measured by 
return on assets and return on equity does not improve after a merger if compared with non-
merging control banks.  Rose used a sample of 106 merging banks and the same number of 
control group banks matched according to size and geographic market.  The results show no 
improvement on either efficiency proxies. 
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Rhoades (1990) analyzes the performance changes before and after 68 mergers between 
1981 and 1987.  To compare the performance of merging and nonmerging banks, Rhoades 
selected 322 peer banks matched by size.  Rhoades’ analysis is based on average performance 
over the period from three years before the merger to three years after.  The results show no 
improvement in either profit or noninterest expenses. 
Berger and Humphrey (1992) study 57 U.S. mergers from 1981 to 1989.  They use the X-
efficiency and technical efficiency scores in addition to return on assets,  total revenues to 
average assets and noninterest expense to total assets.  Their findings show a 5% X-efficiency 
improvement relative to the peer group.  They also find that some mergers improve efficiency, 
while others worsen it.  Berger and Humphrey argue that mergers in which the acquiring firms 
are more efficient than the targets do not lead to efficiency improvement when compared with 
other mergers. 
Akhavein et al. (1997) applied the profit efficiency concept to the sample of merging 
banks used by Berger and Humphrey (1992).  Their findings indicate a 16% average increase in 
acquiring banks profit efficiency when compared to control banks.  Most of the improvement, 
they argue, comes from the output mix changes (from securities to loans).  Inconsistent with 
Berger and Humphrey, they indicate that the banks with the lowest profit efficiencies prior to the 
merger achieved the greatest improvement after the merger. Sharkas and Kabir (2004) use 
parametric and non-parametric approaches to estimate frontier efficiency scores before and after 
a merger using a U.S. banking data set from 1986 to 2000.  Consistent with Akhavein et al., the 
results show that mergers improved cost and profit efficiencies and that both the acquirer and the 
target have lower efficiency levels relative to their peer after merger. 
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Cornett, Hovakimian, Palia, and Tehranian (2003) examine whether corporate 
governance mechanisms reduce the managerial incentive to enter value-destroying bank 
acquisitions.  They look at announcement period abnormal stock returns for diversifying 
(interstate or activity) acquisitions versus focusing (intrastate or activity) acquisitions.  They find 
that the announcement period excess returns earned by the bidder banks are significant and 
negative for diversifying bank acquisitions, but not for focusing acquisitions.  Further, they find 
that corporate governance mechanisms that reduce the manager-shareholder conflict are not as 
effective in diversifying acquisitions as they are in focusing acquisitions.  If corporate 
governance mechanisms used to control the manager-shareholder conflict are less effective in 
interstate diversifying acquisitions, these acquisitions are less likely to be value maximizing.  
Thus, shareholders and bank regulatory agencies should be more vigilant of interstate or activity 
diversifying acquisitions, given that banks’ internal governance mechanisms are not as effective 
at encouraging value maximization. 
Recently, some studies have subsampled the population of banks engaged in merger 
activities according to their shared characteristics.  Subsampling allows researchers to analyze 
whether these shared characteristics create or destroy shareholder wealth as well as whether 
these characteristics affect the performance of the target or acquirer.  By examining bank 
mergers within the context of the focusing versus diversification debate, DeLong (1999) finds 
that the market does distinguish among various types of mergers.  Degree of diversification, 
however, is not the sole influence on returns to merger partners.  Her analysis reveals that the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) increase in relative target to bidder size and decrease in the 
pre-merger performance of targets.  Further dimensions, such as the type of corporate 
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governance (Brickley and James, 1987; Hubbard and Palia, 1997) or agency costs (Cornett, 
Hovakimian, Palia, and Tehranian, 1998) could also influence the return on bank mergers.  
DeLong (2001) shows that long-term performance is enhanced when mergers involve 
inefficient acquirers, when earnings streams are not diversified, and when payment is not made 
solely in cash.  Upon announcement, the market reacts positively to mergers that are both 
activity and geography focusing.  Although the long-term benefits accrue to mergers that focus 
managerial efficiency and revenue streams as well as reduce overinvestment, the market reacts to 
more tangible aspects of focusing, namely activity and geography.  The market seems to 
understand that focusing is beneficial, yet it does not seem to know what aspects of focusing are 
worthwhile.  Amihud et al. (2002) examine the effects of cross-border bank mergers on the risk 
and abnormal returns of acquiring banks.  Generally, they find that neither the total risk nor the 
systematic risk of the acquirer falls relative to other banks in the acquirer’s home market.  The 
abnormal returns to acquirers are negative and significant, but the abnormal returns are 
somewhat  less negative when their risk increases relative to other banks in their home country. 
In this dissertation, we subsample merging banks according their profit efficiency scores 
and then measure and compare the operating performance changes and market reactions of these 
efficiency subgroups.  This idea is motivated by Delong (1999, 2001), who classified banks by 
geographic and activity diversifications.  In this dissertation, we argue that the variables used in 
Delong’s papers are proxies of the means of efficiency, but missed the efficiency itself as a 
determinant of the combined bank’s future efficiency.  While there is voluminous literature 
concerned with the effect of the pre-merger efficiency scores on the post-merger operating 
performance (e.g., Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Shafer, 1993; Rhoades, 1997; and Rhoades et 
al., 2004), this work is the first to discuss the market reaction to bank mergers classified by 
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acquirer and target pre-merger efficiency scores.  Tables 1 and 2 summarize the analytical 
approaches used in the previous literature, including the advantages and the disadvantages of 
these approaches.   
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III.  METHODOLOGY 
3.1.  Methodology Used to Estimate Efficiency Scores 
Modern efficiency measures began with Farrell (1957), who drew upon the work of 
Debru (1951) and Koopmans (1951) to define a simple measure of firm efficiency that can 
account for multiple inputs.  Farrell was able to break down the total efficiency concept into two 
components:  technical efficiency, which shows the firm’s ability to maximize its outputs from a 
given set of inputs; and allocative efficiency, which shows the firm’s ability to use the inputs in 
optimal proportions, given their respective prices.  However, the efficiency measures, according 
to Farrell, assume that the production function of the fully efficient firm is known.  In practice, 
this cannot be the case, and the efficient isoquant must be estimated from sample data.  Farrell 
suggests two ways to extend his work.  One is by developing a non-parametric, piecewise-linear 
convex isoquant.  The other is by using a parametric function, such as the Cobb-Douglas form.  
While most of the literature that has been produced since Farrell’s work has used a parametric 
function, the piecewise-linear convex hull approach to frontier estimation has been considered by 
only a handful of researchers in the two decades following Farrell’s paper. 
 
3.1.1.  The Parametric Stochastic Frontier Approach   
The parametric stochastic frontier approach, in general, specifies a production function 
and recognizes that deviations away from this given technology can be broken down into two 
components:  statistical noise due to events outside the firm’s control and inefficiency.  A 
potential problem with this model is that the error term may cause a misspecification of the 
production function.  This has led to the development of the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), 
which takes into account external factors when estimating efficiency. The SFA imposes specific 
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assumptions about the distribution of both the error term and sources of inefficiency.  Aigner et 
al. (1977) employ a composed error model in which inefficiencies are assumed to follow a 
symmetric distribution, usually the standard normal distribution.  Greene (1990), among others, 
has argued that alternative distributions for inefficiency may be more appropriate than the 
normal distribution (e.g., truncated normal, gamma, and exponential distributions). 
 
3.1.2.  The Non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis 
  Chranes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) coined the term data envelopment analysis (DEA).  
There has since been a multitude of works that have applied and extended the DEA 
methodology.  DEA constructs a frontier based on the sample data rather than using an assumed 
production function.  This non-parametric approach shows how a particular decision making unit 
(DMU) operates relative to other DMUs by providing a benchmark for the best practice 
technology based on the DMUs in the sample.  Because DEA makes no assumptions about 
inefficiency distributions, it is subject to data problems and inaccuracies created by accounting 
rules (Isik, 2000).  However, DEA works better than the parametric approach when the sample 
size is small.  
Following Rangan et al. (1988), Berger et al. (1992), Elyasiani and Mehdian (1992), Fare 
et al. (1994), Grabowaski et al. (1994), Leightner and Lovell (1998), Wheelcock and Wilson 
(1999), Isik and Kabir (2003), and others, we use DEA to measure U.S. banks’ efficiency scores.  
This choice is motivated by the small sample size during some years of our data set.  Some other 
reasons for this choice are:  1) most studies that have used both SFA and DEA have found that 
both approaches preserve the efficiency ranking of the DMUs (see Isik and Kabir, 2002, 2003; 
and Sharkas and Kabir, 2004).  Since the purpose of this dissertation is to use the efficiency 
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scores to rank merging banks according to their efficiency characteristics, we use DEA rather 
than SFA; 2) the non-parametric DEA is the better choice when the industry has experienced a 
series of reforms and/or shocks because we can assume variable returns to scale (which is not an 
option in SFA); and finally, and most importantly, 3) under DEA, profit efficiency scores can be 
broken down into more basic components (cost efficiency, revenue efficiency, etc.).  This point 
is crucially important in this dissertation because the explanatory power of these variables 
(efficiency scores) is used to explain the market’s reaction.4 
 
3.1.2.1.  Definition of Efficiency Measures Under DEA 
Farrell (1957) decomposes the overall cost efficiency (CE) of each DMU into two 
components:  a) technical efficiency (TE), which shows the ability of a DMU to achieve the 
maximum output for a given production set, and b) allocative efficiency (AE), which shows 
management’s ability to construct an optimal product mix, given their respective prices.  
Assuming constant returns to scale (CRS), CE is decomposed as follows: 
 CE = TE × AE (1a) 
Banker et al. (1984) proposed the variable returns to scale frontier (VRS), in which the 
frontier changes over time due to technological progress, financial crises, higher industry 
concentration due to mergers and acquisitions, and financial deregulation (Isik and Kabir 2003).  
However, Banker et al. further decompose TE into two components:  a) pure technical efficiency 
(PTE), which indicates the proportional reduction in input usage if inputs are not wasted; and b) 
scale efficiency (SE), which represents the proportional output reduction if the bank achieves 
CRS.  So, equation 1a can be re-written as follows: 
                                                 
4 This is discussed in detail in the regression framework section 3.2, page 32. 
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 CE = PTE × SE × AE (1b)   
The decomposition of efficiency measures is shown graphically by Isik (2000).  Figure 1 
presents a simple case of a single input (x) and single output (y).  
Figure 1:  Efficiency and Productivity Concepts 
 
 
Source:  Isik and Kabir (2003). 
 
 Assuming CRS, we obtain a flat portion on the long-run average cost curve (the line 
OATFR).  However, because of the structural changes mentioned earlier, the CRS assumption 
may no longer be accurate.  Imposing the VRS assumption, we get a convex hull frontier (curve 
LKBTES).  The VRS frontier shows that the whole industry is facing external factors that cause 
it to operate away from the full capacity utilization represented by the CRS frontier.  To show the 
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efficiency components, assume that DMU1 is observed at point C in year t and at point D in year 
t+1.  Both points are technically inefficient because both of them are interior to the CRS frontier.  
So, at time t, the output technical inefficiency (TIE0) is represented by the distance CF.  Point C 
represents the amount by which outputs could be proportionally increased (from y1 to y3) while 
holding the inputs fixed at x3.  So, TIE0 is represented by AC/Y1C, where TE = 1 – TIE0, and 
TIE0 may be shown graphically by Y1A/Y1C.  Assuming VRS, the convex hull frontier, we can 
calculate the PTE of the output at point C, which is equal to Y1B/Y1C.  DMU1 could be more 
efficient if it moved closer to point B, which represents the best practice benchmark at the VRS 
frontier.  However, point B is not scale efficient because DMU1 can further reduce its input 
usage from x2 to x1 if it can achieve CRS.  So, the SE of DMU1 is represented by Y1A/Y1B, 
which depicts the distance of the DMU from the optimal “virtual” input-output mix.  
 
3.1.2.2.  The Model 
3.1.2.2.1.  Estimation of Technical Efficiency5  
Consider N DMUs (banks), each using two inputs to produce one output.  Assume that all 
DMUs are achieving CRS.  Then, the technical efficiency can be estimated as follows: 
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where TEi is the technical efficiency score of the i-th DMU.  TE is the technical efficiency of 
benchmark DMUs.  iλ  is a 1×N vector of intensity weights defining the linear combination of 
                                                 
5 For simplicity, we assumed a DMU using two inputs to produce one output in this section. However, in subsequent 
sections of this dissertation, these constraints will be relaxed. 
 19
the efficient DMUs to be compared with the i-th DMU.  The first constraint shows that the 
observed outputs of DMUi must be less than or equal to a linear combination of outputs of the 
DMUs forming the efficient frontier.  The second constraint places a restriction on the input side.  
It states that the use of inputs in a linear combination at the efficient frontier should be less than 
or equal to the use of the inputs by the i-th DMU.  The PTE can be estimated by imposing the 
VRS assumption and simply adding the convexity constraint.  Thus, the PTE can be solved with 
the following: 
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where N1 is a vector of ones, and consequently 11
1
==∑
=
λλ orN
i
i .  By adding this constraint, we 
expect to have fewer inefficiencies than with the TE estimates because VRS represent a convex 
hull combination of efficient DMUs in which the intensity weights will be less than when 
assuming CRS.  Finally, SE can be easily estimated by rearranging equation (1b) as follows: 
 
PTE
TESE =  (4) 
3.1.2.2.2.  Estimation of Cost and Allocative Efficiencies 
As shown in the previous section, cost efficiency can be estimated by summing input 
prices rather than output quantities.  Consider n DMUs, where each DMU uses m inputs to 
produce s outputs. The general form of the cost minimization problem is then: 
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where pi is a vector of input prices for the j-th DMU and *ix  is the cost minimization vector of 
input quantities for the j-th DMU, given the input prices and the output levels. 
The first constraint places a restriction on the input side, requiring the use of inputs in a 
linear combination at the efficient frontier to be less than or equal to the use of the inputs by the 
i-th bank.  The second constraint shows that the observed outputs of DMUj must be less than or 
equal to a linear combination of outputs, *ix , of the DMUs forming the efficient frontier.  The 
third constraint assures the feasibility of the solution.  The fourth constraint imposes the VRS 
assumption.  Figure 2 shows the cost efficiency problem assuming CRS, where the point K 
represents a cost inefficient DMU.  The only way to derive a more cost efficient DMU is by 
getting it closer to the efficient frontier.  This can be achieved by using input equal to ∗X  rather 
than 1X , holding the output fixed (the bold horizontal arrow shows this choice).  Finally, the 
cost efficiency of the each DMU can be obtained as follows: 
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Figure 2:  Cost Minimization Problem 
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where the cost efficiency value will be equal to one for the DMUs that lie on the efficient 
frontier.  The cost efficiency scores take values in the range (0,1). 
       We can also obtain the allocative efficiency using equation (1a) as follows:                                                  
TE
CEAEAETECE =⇒×=  
 
3.1.2.2.3.  Estimation of Revenue Efficiency 
Using the same considerations as in the previous section, we can obtain the revenue 
efficiency (RE) scores for each DMU.  The revenue maximization problem maximizes the vector 
of output quantities, *y , in the first step.  Then, the revenue-maximizing problem is calculated as 
follows: 
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where rq is a vector of output prices for the j-th DMU, and 
*
ry  is the maximization vector of 
output quantities of the DMUs forming the efficient frontier.  The first constraint indicates that 
the use of the inputs in a linear combination of efficient DMUs must be less than or equal to the 
use of inputs of the j-th DMU.  The second constraint shows that the observed outputs of the j-th 
DMU must be less than or equal to the linear combination of the DMUs forming the efficient 
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frontier.  Figure 3 shows the revenue efficiency problem assuming CRS where the point K 
represents a revenue inefficient DMU.  The only way to derive a more revenue efficient DMU is 
by getting it closer to the efficient frontier.  This can be achieved by producing input equal to 
∗Y  rather than 1Y , holding the input level fixed.  The bold upward arrow represents this choice.  
The last two constraints are well defined in the previous section.  After solving the above 
problem, we can obtain RE as follows: 
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=
 is the virtual efficiency 
profit that could be achieved if the DMU were situated on the efficient frontier.  The value of the 
profit efficiency scores will always fall in the range (0, 1).  
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Figure 3:  Revenue Maximization Problem 
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3.1.2.2.4.  Estimation of Profit Efficiency 
Summing the cost and revenue efficiencies generates the profit efficiency (PE) concept, 
which seeks to minimize costs and maximize revenue simultaneously.  Unlike cost and revenue 
efficiencies, PE is obtained by allowing inputs and outputs to vary.  Figure 4 shows the PE 
problem assuming CRS where the point K represents a profit inefficient DMU.  To derive a more 
profit efficient DMU, managers have many choices that can manipulate the DMU so that it will 
lie on the efficient frontier. They may decrease inputs, increase outputs, or both.  The multiple 
arrows in Figure 4 show these choices.  The bold upward arrow represents one extreme choice 
that is equivalent to the revenue maximization solution, and the horizontal bold arrow represents 
the other extreme, the solution to the cost minimization problem.  The profit maximization 
problem can be described as follows: 
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where the first constraint indicates that the use of the inputs in a linear combination of efficient 
DMUs must be less than or equal the use of inputs of the j-th DMU.  The second constraint 
shows that the observed outputs of the j-th DMU must be less than or equal to the linear 
combination of the DMUs forming the efficient frontier.  However, the two constraints in this  
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Figure 4:  Profit Maximization Problem 
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problem are solved simultaneously.  The third constraint is imposed to assure that the revenue 
maximization and cost minimization are both achieved.  This constraint requires that the inputs 
of the j-th DMU must be greater than or equal to the output of the DMUs on the efficient 
frontier, and it indicates that the output of the j-th DMU must be less than or equal to the outputs 
of the DMUs on the efficient fronteir.  This constraint is important because it is possible to 
maximize profit efficiency by minimizing costs only.  In this case, profit maximization will be 
equivalent to cost minimization.  The same argument is valid for the revenue efficiency.  Finally, 
the profit efficiency can be obtained using the following equation: 
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 represents the observed profitability of DMUi.  This value could be 
negative for DMUs with losses.  *
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− , on the other hand, represents the virtual 
profitability that could be achieved if the DMU is located on the efficient frontier.  Accordingly, 
the profit efficiency values must lie in the range )1,( α− . 
 
3.1.2.2.5.  Malmquist Total Productivity Index 
       Presented by Fare et al. (1994), Malmquist total productivity index is a product of 
two sources:  the efficiency gain or loss (known as the catch-up effect6) and technological 
changes caused by innovations or shocks.  The efficiency changes, according to Fare et al., show 
how close the DMU gets to the efficient frontier.  In other words, it shows managers’ ability to 
                                                 
6 The catch-up effect represents the technical efficiency of section 3.1.2.2.1. 
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improve efficiency internally.  The external or technology effect shows how much the efficient 
frontier itself shifts at each DMU input mix.  The Malmquist index is represented by the 
following equation : 
 
    
 
The Malmquist index is normally used to analyze the effect of economic shocks on the 
whole economy or the whole sector (Isik, 2000; Isik and Hassan, 2003).  In this dissertation, we 
are utilizing this index to follow the post-merger changes relative to the year of the merger event. 
We apply the DEA methodology to the universe of U.S. commercial banks to obtain 
technical, scale, allocative, and X-efficiency scores (using SIC codes 6021, 6022, 6035, and 
6036).  One problem in the efficiency literature is that the efficient frontier is generated using 
samples of merging and/or peer banks only (see Burger and Humphrey, 1992; DeYoung, 1993; 
and Rhodes, 1997).  However, this sampling method may cause results to vary from one study to 
another.  We attempt to rectify this problem by using the entire universe of U.S. commercial 
banks.  Our next step is to classify each merger according to the efficiency characteristics of the 
acquirer and the target.  We choose profit efficiency to separately classify acquirers and targets 
into three groups since profit efficiency is the most conservative and demanding efficiency 
measure.  The three groups are high efficiency banks, medium efficiency banks, and low 
efficiency banks.  So, our sample consists of the following nine merger classifications 
(acquirer/target):  low efficiency/low efficiency (LELE); low efficiency/medium efficiency 
(LEME); low efficiency/high efficiency (LEHE); medium efficiency/low efficiency (MELE); 
medium efficiency/medium efficiency (MEME); medium efficiency/high efficiency (MEHE); 
)9(
),(
),(
),(
),(
),(
),(
changecalTechnologi
2
1
1111
11
changeEfficiency
111
444444 3444444 21444 3444 21


 ××=
++++
+++++
tt
CRS
t
tt
CRS
t
tt
CRS
t
tt
CRS
t
tt
CRS
t
tt
CRS
t
yxD
yxD
yxD
yxD
yxD
yxDM
 29
high efficiency/low efficiency (HELE); high efficiency/medium efficiency (HEME); and high 
efficiency/high efficiency (HEHE).  To get these classifications, we allowed one standard 
deviation around the annual mean to get the average bank’s efficiency range/bounds.  Any bank 
with an efficiency score higher than the upper bound is considered a high efficiency bank.  Any 
bank with an efficiency score less than the lower bound is considered a low efficiency bank.  The 
classifications are performed one time period before a merger to reflect the latest efficiency 
signal perceived by the market.  Akhavein et al. (1997) indicate that the average profit efficiency 
scores of U.S. banks range from 25% to 65%, although cost and revenue efficiencies are 
significantly higher. 
Our sample of acquirers and targets are matched when the merger is announced.  Based 
on our classification scheme, our final sample consists of nine merger combinations.  We expect 
each combination to cause the market to react in a unique way.7  To examine if the market is 
reacting to the merger announcement, we match our sample of merging banks to a control group 
of non-merging banks according to size as measured by total assets.  Following Healy et al. 
(1992), we match the non-merging (control) bank sample with the merging bank sample one year 
after the merger.  According to Healy, this will ensure a fair future comparison with the control 
group.  Efficiency scores will be compared before and after the merger.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Acquirers’ and targets market reactions are fully discussed in chapter six of this work. 
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Table 1:  Summary of Operating Performance Studies 
 
Panel A:  Advantages and disadvantages of traditional operating performance studies. 
Approach Benefits Shortcomings 
Operating Performance Studies -Compares the operating 
performance before and after 
mergers. 
- Use accounting data. 
 
- Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian 
(2003); Gupta and Misra, (2004); 
DeYoung, et al. (2004); Bouwman 
(2004); DeYoung, Hunter, and 
Undell (2003), Carter and McNulty 
(2004); Rose (1987); Rhoades 
(1990). 
 
 
 
- There are methodological 
problems with using performance 
ratios to measure cost and profit 
efficiencies because ratios do not 
control for differences in input 
prices and output mix. 
   
 
 
 
Panel B:  Advantages and disadvantages of improved operating performance studies. 
Approach Benefits Shortcomings 
Operating Performance Studies, 
using efficiency measures (DEA 
approach). 
Berger and Humphrey (1992); 
Rhoades(1997); Akhavein et al. 
(1997); Sharkas and Kabir (2004). 
-Compares the operating 
performance before and after 
mergers. 
- The solution is derived from 
within the sample. 
- Controls for differences in 
input prices and output mix. 
- The efficiency measures can 
be broken down into more 
specific efficiency measures.  
- Does not control for sample 
errors. 
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Table 2:  Summary of Event Studies 
 
Panel A:  Advantages and disadvantages of traditional event studies. 
Approach Benefits Shortcomings 
Event Studies  -The methodology used is 
more standardized than the 
methodologies used in 
operating performance studies.  
- Period specification around merger 
announcements vary greatly from study 
to study. 
- Cornett, Hovakimian, Palia, 
and Tehranian (2003); Elyasiani 
and Deng (2004). 
- Used mainly to analyze the 
stock return reaction (of 
acquiring and target firms) to 
merger announcements.  
-The mixed/puzzling findings (which are 
generally due to sampling errors).  
   
 
 
 
Panel B:  Advantages and disadvantages of improved event studies. 
Approach Benefits Shortcomings 
Event studies with sub-sampling: 
DeLong (1999); DeLong (2001); 
Amihud et al. (2002).   
- Sub-samples the population 
of merging banks according 
to specific characteristics in 
order to overcome puzzling 
effects that may due to 
mixing the samples. 
- Period specification around merger 
announcements vary greatly from study 
to study. 
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IV.  DATA, SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS  
4.1.  Data and Sample Characteristics 
We examine a sample of successful domestic public mergers occurring during the period 
1992-2003.  The sample of cash, mixed, and stock-for-stock mergers comes from the Securities 
Data Company’s (SDC) U.S. Merger and Acquisition database.  We select a sample of mergers 
and acquisitions with announcement dates between 1992 and 2003 and eliminate those with 
effective dates outside this period.  All mergers in the sample were completed by December 
2003.  We consider only mergers where acquiring firms attain 100% of the shares of the target 
firm to enable the acquirer to re-allocate resources more efficiently, i.e., the target is de-listed 
after merger and is no longer a decision making unit.  Further, we require that:  (1) the acquirer 
and the target have SIC codes 6021 (banks, commercial: national), 6022 (banks, commercial: 
state), 6035 (banks, savings: federal), or 6036 (banks, savings: not federally chartered); (2) the 
transaction is completed; and (3) the acquirer and the target are both public firms with data 
available in the Center for Research in Security Prices data base (CRSP) for at least one year 
prior to the merger announcement date.  The resulting sample includes some banks that engaged 
in multiple acquisitions during the sample period.  We required that accounting and stock market 
data for both firms be available from the Compustat database and from CRSP.  Also, the firms 
had to be in existence for at least one year prior to the merger announcement.  This requirement 
is important for us to be able to classify mergers according to their efficiency scores achieved 
one year before the merger.  
The data extracted from CRSP consists of market capitalizations of the acquirers and 
targets in addition to other variables used to obtain the efficiency scores.  The market 
capitalization of a firm is the product of the total number of shares outstanding and the closing 
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price per share as measured at the end of the year prior to the stock-for-stock merger 
announcement.  The relative size is then measured as the ratio of the market capitalization of the 
acquirer to the market capitalization of the target bank.  
Since the main purpose of this dissertation is to study the market reaction to merger 
announcements, we construct a set of control banks to which the acquiring banks are compared.  
For each bank in the sample, we find a control bank by searching the Compustat database for all 
firms with SIC codes 6000-6999.  From this list of firms, we exclude the acquirers and targets 
that appear in any year of the sample period.  We select a firm for the control group that has the 
same 4-digit SIC code as that of the acquiring bank with a market value greater than the 
acquirer’s market value but not exceeding it by more than 25%.  The final sample consists of 359 
mergers.  Table 3 shows the distribution of mergers over the study period.  
 
Table 3:  Summary Statistics of Cash, Stock, and Combination Mergers 
 
  SDC       
Final 
Sample       
Year Stock Cash Combination Total Stock Cash Combination Total 
1992 7 1 1 9 5 1 1 7 
1993 25 43 6 74 9 39 2 50 
1994 31 1 6 38 24 0 3 27 
1995 26 3 3 32 23 3 4 30 
1996 25 9 7 41 21 8 6 35 
1997 52 0 6 58 46 0 4 50 
1998 38 2 2 42 31 1 2 34 
1999 47 0 2 49 31 0 2 33 
2000 23 1 5 29 17 1 4 22 
2001 15 16 10 41 14 11 7 32 
2002 3 0 11 14 1 0 10 11 
2003 12 0 20 32 10 0 18 28 
Total 304 75 79 458 232 64 63 359 
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 As the table shows, most of the merger deals were accomplished by using the stock-for-
stock method of acquisition, especially during the 1992-1997 period.  Using a combination of 
stocks and cash has become more favorable since that time.  Cash-only financing, however, is 
relatively rare.  In fact, there were no cash deals in the last two years of the sample.  The method 
of using a cash and stock combination, on the other hand, increased substantially in 2002 and 
2003.  In general, 65% of merger deals were stock-for-stock, 17.5% used cash only, and 17.5% 
used a combination of cash and stock, with stock accounting for a greater percentage of the total 
transaction value. One reason for the extensive use of stocks is suggested by the information 
asymmetry theory discussed in chapter two where acquirers use stock for stock financing when 
they believe that their stocks are over valued. 
 
4.2.  Bank Efficiency Variables 
DEA needs a set of inputs and outputs in order to measure efficiency, and therefore, 
relative productivity.  There are two main approaches to measure efficiency:  the production 
approach and the intermediation approach (see Sealy and Lindley, 1997).  In the production 
approach, outputs are measured as number of bills or processed transactions, and inputs are 
measured as capital or labor force, but not as interest expense.  In contrast, the intermediation 
approach assumes that banks are considered brokers who transform financial resources into 
profits.  This approach is more commonly used in the study of banking efficiency, and so, we 
adopt the intermediation approach in this study.  Accordingly, we model commercial banks as 
multi-product firms, producing two outputs and employing three inputs.  All variables are 
measured in millions of U.S. dollars except prices, which are measured as ratios.  
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The outputs include (1) net loans and (2) other earning assets, which consist of loans to 
special sectors, interbank loans, and investment securities (Treasuries and other securities).  All 
output prices are estimated as proxies.  These are calculated as follows:  1) the price of loans is 
defined as total interest income to net loans, and 2) the price of other operating income is defined 
as other operating income to other earning assets weighted by the proportion of other earning 
assets over the total of other earning assets plus off balance sheet items. 
Inputs include (1) personnel expenses; (2) book value of premises and fixed assets; and 
(3) loanable funds, which is defined as the sum of demand and time deposits and non-deposit 
funds as of the end of the respective year.  Also inputs prices are estimated as proxies.  The price 
of labor is calculated as personnel expenses over total assets.  The price of capital is calculated as 
non-interest expense over total assets.  Finally, the price of funds is calculated as total interest 
expense over loanable funds. 
Table 4 shows the summary statistics for the total input and output variables of targets, 
acquirers, and control banks.  Panel A of Table 4 shows the absolute dollar value of input and 
output variables.  To make the comparison easier, we divided each of the variable values in 2003 
by its respective value in 1992.  The results are shown in Panel B of Table 4.  The results 
indicate that loans by acquirers had increased by 1300% when compared with 1992.  This huge 
growth was complimented by an 800% growth in deposits.  Loans by targets, on the other hand, 
had increased by 317%.  This growth was complimented by a 228% increase in targets’ deposits.  
Loans by control banks increased by 252% combined with a 221% increase in their deposits.  
This result is interesting because it clarifies that acquirers usually depend more on equity in 
running their businesses.  The same result is indicated for the other earning assets where 
acquirers had increased their investment by 900%, while targets and control banks had increases 
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in this category of only 255% and 501%, respectively.  This result is also interesting because it 
shows that some banks (acquirers and control banks) were able to take advantage of the Graham-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1997, which allowed banks to engage in investment banking activities. 
Table 4:  Summary Statistics of Input and Output Variables 
 
Panel A:  Summary Statistics of Input and Output Variables (millions of U.S. dollars) 
  Net Loans 
Other Earning 
Assets 
Personnel 
Expenses 
Fixed 
Assets Deposits 
1992 Targets 32384.140 11361.026 1441.619 864.699 45348.602 
 Acquirers 44359.672 16461.305 2220.966 1759.355 72166.153 
 Control 2057746.360 628092.757 68667.917 52293.037 2539060.872
1993 Targets 59781.355 28179.600 2478.037 1668.731 78995.545 
 Acquirers 237504.823 102354.905 9210.410 6036.420 301744.604 
 Control 2560273.104 840796.135 81624.213 66345.998 3059650.457
1994 Targets 41162.852 23749.576 1368.739 972.653 51658.306 
 Acquirers 181032.243 68647.585 6035.107 4041.123 211192.288 
 Control 2988152.657 1021552.537 94122.283 77881.755 3512706.621
1995 Targets 18811.355 13424.110 498.997 385.468 24880.870 
 Acquirers 202753.427 70654.547 6214.644 4446.527 215269.891 
 Control 3272007.679 1157550.794 107068.139 79979.061 3813369.289
1996 Targets 88730.843 35638.934 2395.439 1940.206 97764.289 
 Acquirers 193673.264 66535.024 6002.423 4376.765 215995.052 
 Control 3620418.362 1237120.741 115848.839 89019.018 4181415.349
1997 Targets 43604.598 17240.162 1142.941 1075.261 47444.579 
 Acquirers 354143.964 127520.879 9333.761 6931.249 353955.770 
 Control 3727177.084 1406157.121 122230.720 89656.356 4402039.543
1998 Targets 62638.931 28086.753 2002.851 1675.659 75350.127 
 Acquirers 421257.069 171160.366 10918.988 7929.734 419583.190 
 Control 4399297.518 1766488.944 150118.578 108159.536 5191643.304
1999 Targets 179861.811 45227.159 5646.307 3290.196 178630.942 
 Acquirers 380657.756 123247.374 14144.422 8185.844 395635.367 
 Control 5068112.369 2140701.645 165753.043 118986.177 5562257.267
2000 Targets 31815.567 10418.180 875.138 578.257 33335.930 
 Acquirers 575776.255 184908.732 20127.919 10883.778 531828.528 
 Control 6184481.320 2751574.055 200821.779 143506.611 6599088.928
2001 Targets 4940.826 1792.615 133.534 138.638 5684.517 
 Acquirers 407663.966 149410.529 14109.019 8015.609 433553.386 
 Control 7092299.308 3343526.371 219634.852 166213.983 7838389.165
2002 Targets 2300.901 2563.388 73.569 39.247 4091.785 
 Acquirers 49744.381 14549.194 2034.203 1384.693 58407.713 
 Control 8065761.963 3899872.141 235989.85 185364.577 9154674.014
2003 Targets 134904.236 40346.902 4635.848 2533.303 148895.093 
 Acquirers 616983.024 160988.827 22199.200 9699.117 631671.542 
 Control 7264942.840 3775541.920 220142.046 171644.621 8144540.172
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table continued 
 
Panel B:  Growth Rates of Input and Output Variables for the Study Period, 1992-2003 (times) 
  Net Loans 
Other 
Earning 
Assets 
Personnel 
Expenses 
Fixed 
Assets Deposits 
(1992-03) Targets 4.170 3.550 3.22 2.930 3.280 
(1992-03) Acquirers 13.9100 9.780 10.00 5.510 8.750 
(1992-03) Control 3.530 6.010 3.21 3.280 3.210 
Inputs include:  (1) personnel expenses; (2) book value of premises and fixed assets; and (3) loanable funds, which 
is defined as the sum of deposit (demand and time) and non-deposit funds as of the end of the respective year.  The 
outputs include (1) net loans; and (2) other earning assets, which consist of loans to special sectors, interbank loans, 
and investment securities (Treasuries and other securities).  
 
  Looking at the cost side (inputs side), acquirers had increased their personnel expenses 
by 900% when compared with 1992, which is tremendously higher than the growth rates of 
personnel expenses of targets and control banks (220% increases for each).  Acquirers also had 
increased their fixed assets by 450%, which is considerably higher than targets and control 
banks, which increased by 190% and 220%, respectively.  This result looks consistent with 
Akhavein et al. (1997) and Rhoades (1997), who argue that consultants and managers are 
motivated more often by cost efficiency improvement than by any other motive. 
Table 5 shows the summary statistics of input and output prices.  To make reading this 
table easier, we plotted all variables separately.  In addition, we added an interest margin variable 
(interest on loans minus interest on deposits) to get a better grasp of each group’s profitability 
from traditional banking activities.  Starting with the price of loans, non-merging banks typically 
charged higher interest than acquirers and targets.  This result appears for all years except 1992, 
1993, and 1999 (see Figure 5).  Ranked second, targets charged higher interest on loans than 
acquirers.  This can be explained by the higher risk premium that smaller banks charge relative 
to larger banks.  According to DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell (2003), small banks’ access to “soft 
information” about their clients make them more accurate in determining customers’ 
creditworthiness, especially in smaller communities where direct communication is more  
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Table 5:  Summary Statistics of Input and Output Prices 
 
  
    Loans 
Other 
Earning 
Assets 
Personnel 
Expenses 
Fixed 
Assets Deposits 
Interest 
Margin 
1992 Targets 0.143 0.020 0.026 0.013 0.060 0.083 
 Acquirers 0.131 0.013 0.022 0.009 0.042 0.089 
  Control 0.131 0.015 0.022 0.010 0.047 0.084 
1993 Targets 0.128 0.010 0.017 0.010 0.044 0.085 
 Acquirers 0.128 0.011 0.018 0.010 0.040 0.088 
  Control 0.119 0.011 0.020 0.010 0.037 0.082 
1994 Targets 0.112 0.008 0.017 0.008 0.042 0.070 
 Acquirers 0.105 0.012 0.021 0.010 0.035 0.070 
  Control 0.115 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.038 0.077 
1995 Targets 0.122 0.007 0.018 0.008 0.046 0.077 
 Acquirers 0.119 0.010 0.018 0.010 0.050 0.068 
  Control 0.124 0.010 0.019 0.009 0.047 0.077 
1996 Targets 0.118 0.008 0.017 0.008 0.050 0.068 
 Acquirers 0.120 0.009 0.018 0.010 0.045 0.075 
  Control 0.119 0.010 0.019 0.009 0.048 0.071 
1997 Targets 0.113 0.007 0.016 0.009 0.051 0.062 
 Acquirers 0.108 0.013 0.018 0.012 0.050 0.058 
  Control 0.119 0.011 0.019 0.010 0.050 0.070 
1998 Targets 0.116 0.010 0.019 0.010 0.045 0.071 
 Acquirers 0.115 0.013 0.018 0.012 0.052 0.063 
  Control 0.122 0.012 0.019 0.010 0.050 0.072 
1999 Targets 0.108 0.010 0.019 0.011 0.046 0.062 
 Acquirers 0.111 0.016 0.021 0.013 0.045 0.066 
  Control 0.112 0.011 0.019 0.010 0.049 0.063 
2000 Targets 0.122 0.004 0.018 0.007 0.052 0.070 
 Acquirers 0.110 0.015 0.020 0.013 0.052 0.058 
  Control 0.115 0.011 0.019 0.010 0.069 0.046 
2001 Targets 0.106 0.007 0.017 0.009 0.048 0.058 
 Acquirers 0.105 0.011 0.018 0.011 0.044 0.061 
  Control 0.110 0.012 0.018 -0.004 0.054 0.056 
2002 Targets 0.091 0.011 0.014 0.009 0.015 0.076 
 Acquirers 0.078 0.020 0.023 0.011 0.019 0.059 
  Control 0.100 0.013 0.019 0.010 0.037 0.063 
2003 Targets 0.082 0.013 0.020 0.010 0.025 0.057 
 Acquirers 0.072 0.014 0.018 0.010 0.023 0.049 
  Control 0.085 0.014 0.020 0.015 0.026 0.059 
       The price of labor is calculated as personnel expenses over total assets.  The price of capital is calculated as 
non-interest expense over total assets.  The price of funds is calculated as total interest expense over loanable funds.  
The price of loans is determined as total interest income over net loans.  The price of other operating income is 
defined as the ratio of other operating income to other earning assets.  Interest margin is the difference between the 
interest paid on loans and the interest paid on deposits. 
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Figure 5:  Interest on Loans of Targets, Acquirers, and Control Banks 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
feasible.  On the other hand, they argue that large banks have better access to “hard information” 
and have a comparative advantage gained by the use of new technology in their operations.  This 
advantage of capital intensity in banking operations allows large banks to gain more economies 
of scale in their operations while sacrificing accuracy in evaluating customers’ creditworthiness.  
On the other hand, interest paid on deposits is higher in non-merging banks than in either 
acquirers or targets for the period from 1999 to 2003.  For earlier years, we find no clear 
difference between groups (see Figure 6).  To have a more complete idea of the profits generated 
from traditional banking activities, we added an interest margin variable to our summary 
statistics variables (Column 6 of Table 5).  Figure 7 shows that for the period 1999-2003, targets 
were achieving the highest interest margin.  One explanation for this could be that the small 
banks tend to depend more on lending activities relative to other banks.  Actually, the passage of 
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act in 1997 may have facilitated this result by enticing banks with  
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Figure 6:  Interest Paid on Deposits of Targets, Acquirers, and Control Banks 
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Figure 7:  Interest Rate Margin for Targets, Acquirers, and Control Banks 
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sufficient resources to invest more in capital markets, while small banks remained focused on 
traditional banking activities.  This result is supported by the return on other earning assets 
(investment).  Exhibited in Figure 8, and consistent with our previous discussion, acquirers have 
the highest return on investment.  Ranked second, control banks appear to be balanced in their 
investment and banking policies.  Except for 1992, targets are ranked last in return on 
investment.  It appears that acquirers have a comparative advantage in non-traditional banking 
activities over targets, but targets have a comparative advantage in traditional banking activities 
over acquirers.  
Figure 8:  Rate of Return on Other Earning Assets of the Targets, Acquirers, Control 
Banks 
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Figure 9 shows a comparison of personnel expenses to total assets (price of labor).  
Targets achieved the lowest labor price, except for in 1992 and 2003.  In these years, acquirers 
achieved the lowest price.  In contrast, control banks maintained a smooth, stable trend for the 
whole period.  This result supports the cost minimization motive of mergers, where acquirers 
choose targets that have lower operating costs.  
Figure 9:  Personnel Expense of Targets, Acquirers, and Control Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, Figure 10 shows the percentage of fixed assets to total assets.  Acquirers have the 
highest ratio, while targets have the lowest ratio.  One reason for this is the geographic dispersion 
of large banks.  
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Figure 10:  Rate of Return on Other Earning Assets of Targets, Acquirers, and Control 
Banks 
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V.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON EFFICIENCY CONCEPTS 
In this section, we discuss the summary statistics of cost, technical, pure technical, scale, 
allocative, revenue, and profit efficiency scores for acquirers, targets, and control banks for the 
period from 1992 to 2003.  These results were obtained from the DEA linear programming 
problems solved for each bank.  Our results are derived from efficient frontiers constructed 
separately for each year.  Table 6 shows the number of banks included in constructing our annual 
frontiers.  Unlike much of previous literature (see Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Rhoades, 1997; 
and Akhavein et al., 1997), we included the largest possible sample of non-merging banks.  This 
is crucially important because we argue that the market distinguishes the efficiency 
characteristics relative to the whole industry even before the merger is announced.  In other 
words, acquirers and targets cannot be matched with each other in one frontier because they were 
not yet recognized by the market as a pair.  Accordingly, the more banks that we can include in 
determining the efficient frontier, the more reliable the efficiency scores will be. 
Table 6:  Number of Banks Used to Construct the Non-parametric Efficient Frontier, 1991-
2002 
 
Year Stock Cash Combination 
Number of Merger 
Deals Non- Merging Banks  
Efficient 
Frontier 
1992 5 1 1 7 149 156 
1993 9 39 2 50 102 152 
1994 24 0 3 27 539 566 
1995 23 3 4 30 561 591 
1996 21 8 6 35 542 577 
1997 46 0 4 50 518 568 
1998 31 1 2 34 497 531 
1999 31 0 2 33 501 534 
2000 17 1 4 22 564 586 
2001 14 11 7 32 548 580 
2002 1 0 10 11 571 582 
2003 10 0 18 28 548 576 
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Our efficiency analysis is fully discussed in the following three sections.  In the first 
section, the efficiency characteristics of merging and non-merging banks for the whole study 
period are examined.  The efficiency changes following the merger event are discussed in detail 
in the second section.  We chose two methods to determine the efficiency changes.  The first is 
using the time trend of the efficiency scores considering the year of merger as the base year.  The 
second is by using large and small banks as control banks to compare it with these banks.  We 
further applied the Malmquist total productivity index for mergers of large and small merging 
banks combined with the peer groups of each size.  As mentioned earlier, the Malmquist total 
productivity index is used to check if the efficiency improvement is derived from efficiency 
change and/or from technology change.  Finally, the last section of this chapter discusses the 
efficiency changes of the nine merger combinations we presented earlier, where the profit 
efficiency scores will be deducted for each efficiency pair for the four years following the 
merger event.  This section is crucially important because it enables us to judge if the market 
reaction is derived from the expectations about the future cash flows of the merger, and if the 
market can distinguish between the profit efficiency characteristics of the merger parties.      
Tables 7 through 13 show the efficiency results of all groups.  To make comparison 
easier, we present the results in Figures 11 through 17. 
 
5.1.  The Efficiency Characteristics of Merging and Non-merging Banks 
In this section, we describe the efficiency characteristics of acquirers, targets, and non-
merging banks as of the year of merger.  We first describe the cost efficiency of each party, and 
then we attempt to explain the source of the increased or decreased cost efficiency of each party 
by breaking down the cost efficiency concept into its more basic efficiency determinants.  Next, 
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revenue efficiency will be also compared between groups to determine which party has the 
greater ability to generate revenues.  Finally, profit efficiency is also investigated for merging 
and non-merging banks.  
 
5.1.1.  Cost, Technical, Pure technical, Scale, and Allocative Efficiencies 
In this section, we discuss the cost efficiency results and the other related efficiency 
measures.  Table 7 shows the average cost efficiency scores of acquirers, targets, and non-
merging banks.  Acquirers maintain the highest cost efficiency until 1998, when the whole sector 
experienced a substantial decrease in cost efficiency.  The comparison between 1992 and 2003 
indicates that acquirers achieved 58% and 31% efficiency scores, respectively.  This means that 
acquirers were able to reduce the waste in inputs by 42% in 1992 and by 69% in 2003.  Targets 
and non-merging banks, on the other hand, look very similar in terms of cost efficiency and time 
trends.  However, the minimum efficiency scores were always reported within non-merging 
banks.  Figure 11 shows the trend of cost efficiency and the industry-wide decrease in cost 
efficiency scores. 
To understand the source of loss in cost efficiency, we use Equations 1a and 1b to break 
down the cost efficiency concept into its more basic components, technical efficiency and 
allocative efficiency: 
CE = TE ×  AE                                                                         (1a)   
CE = PTE × SE × AE                                                               (1b)   
where the first equation shows that cost efficiency is a product of technical efficiency 
(TE), which represents the ability of the bank to achieve the maximum output for a given input 
level, and allocative efficiency (AE), which indicates the management’s success in constructing 
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an optimal product mix, given their respective prices.  Equation 1b decomposes further the 
technical efficiency into pure technical efficiency (PTE), which represents the proportional 
reduction in input usage if inputs are not wasted, and the scale efficiency (SE), which indicates 
the proportional output reduction if the bank achieves constant returns to scale (CRS).   
Table 8 shows the average annual technical efficiency scores for all groups.  In general, 
the technical efficiency scores look very similar.  In other words, all the banks have essentially 
the same ability to achieve the optimal output, given their input levels.  Figure 12 depicts this 
and shows the loss in technical efficiency over the study period.  However, this steady smooth 
decrease is not enough to explain the significant loss of cost efficiency.  
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Table 7:  The Non-parametric Cost Efficiency Scores of Targets, Acquirers, and Control Banks 
 
          
  Target   Acquirer   Control  
 Mean 
Standard 
Error Min Mean 
Standard 
Error Min Mean 
Standard 
Error Min 
1992 0.6041 0.0884 0.4831 0.5869 0.0760 0.4671 0.6131 0.1525 0.2379 
1993 0.5676 0.1136 0.4061 0.5957 0.1286 0.4081 0.5563 0.1361 0.2626 
1994 0.5040 0.1039 0.3749 0.5528 0.1214 0.3933 0.4764 0.1260 0.2569 
1995 0.5014 0.1321 0.3279 0.5934 0.1631 0.3315 0.4991 0.1481 0.0660 
1996 0.4965 0.1654 0.3218 0.5026 0.1452 0.3236 0.4914 0.1531 0.1719 
1997 0.4933 0.1573 0.3000 0.5735 0.1557 0.2897 0.5018 0.1471 0.2646 
1998 0.5006 0.1190 0.2893 0.5328 0.1408 0.3400 0.4859 0.1440 0.0987 
1999 0.4596 0.1084 0.3048 0.2513 0.1506 0.1144 0.2675 0.1559 0.0637 
2000 0.2276 0.1044 0.1002 0.1790 0.1170 0.0744 0.1258 0.1286 0.0168 
2001 0.1174 0.0812 0.0372 0.2576 0.1172 0.0445 0.2943 0.1347 0.0674 
2002 0.2306 0.0550 0.0971 0.2799 0.0846 0.1960 0.3293 0.1391 0.0924 
2003 0.3133 0.1161 0.2026 0.3088 0.1277 0.2007 0.3330 0.1474 0.1068 
          
 
The non-parametric cost efficiency scores of targets, acquirers, and other non-merging banks. The cost minimization problem is solved according to Equation 5.  
The cost efficiency scores presented in this table are obtained by the following equation: 
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*x  is the optimal input quantity and ix  is the actual inputs quantity.  The 
cost efficiency score will be one for DMUs on the efficient frontier.  The cost efficiency scores take values in the range (0,1). 
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Figure 11:  The Non-parametric Cost Efficiency Scores of Targets, Acquirers, and Control 
Banks 
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Figure 12:  The Non-parametric Technical Efficiency Scores of Targets, Acquirers, and 
Control Banks 
 
 
The Non-Parametric Technical Efficiency 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
Te
ch
ni
ca
l E
ffi
ci
en
cy
 
Target Acquirer Others 
 
 50
Table 8:  The Non-parametric Technical Efficiency Scores of Targets, Acquirers, and Control Banks 
 
          
  Target   Acquirer   Control  
 Mean 
Standard 
Error Min Mean 
Standard 
Error Min Mean 
Standard 
Error Min 
1992 0.5741 0.0768 0.4789 0.5699 0.0528 0.4678 0.5746 0.1314 0.2448 
1993 0.5003 0.1125 0.3785 0.5158 0.1323 0.3785 0.4687 0.0948 0.2268 
1994 0.4543 0.0740 0.3598 0.4528 0.0612 0.3780 0.4465 0.1068 0.1932 
1995 0.4938 0.1484 0.3130 0.4451 0.1058 0.3283 0.4304 0.1217 0.2140 
1996 0.4423 0.1522 0.3057 0.4004 0.1156 0.2804 0.4050 0.1053 0.1538 
1997 0.4246 0.1056 0.2867 0.4666 0.0909 0.2952 0.4305 0.1156 0.2106 
1998 0.4628 0.1328 0.2942 0.4516 0.0922 0.3463 0.4298 0.1141 0.0759 
1999 0.4138 0.0847 0.2659 0.3814 0.0674 0.2748 0.3811 0.1239 0.0783 
2000 0.3552 0.0599 0.2590 0.3355 0.0540 0.2330 0.3384 0.1231 0.1139 
2001 0.3623 0.1335 0.1821 0.3667 0.1113 0.2761 0.3641 0.1256 0.0730 
2002 0.3340 0.0746 0.2391 0.3102 0.0535 0.2372 0.3373 0.1344 0.0596 
2003 0.3678 0.1603 0.2270 0.4477 0.1225 0.2898 0.4243 0.1325 0.0473 
          
 
The non-parametric technical efficiency (TE) scores of targets, acquirers, and other non-merging banks.  The input-oriented TE problem is solved according to 
Equation 3, assuming constant returns to scale.  The TE scores presented in this table are obtained as follows: 
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TE .  The TE score is one for DMUs on the efficient frontier.  TE scores take values in the range (0,1). 
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Table 9 shows the pure technical efficiency results.  Acquirers dominated the other two 
groups for the entire study period, except for the last two years.  Between 1992 and 2003, 
acquirers lost 13% (61.1%-48.8) of their efficiency and non-merging banks lost 15% (63.7-48.6).  
In opposition to this trend, targets achieved steady efficiency improvements over the study 
period.  They began with an 18% efficiency score in 1992, and concluded the study period with a 
score of 44% in 2003.  However, targets had the minimum technical efficiency for all years.  
Figure 13 shows the pure technical efficiency trend over the years.  Scale efficiency, on the other 
hand, remains steady over time for all groups.  Table 10 and Figure 14 show the results of the 
scale efficiency analysis.  Summing up, the slight decrease in technical efficiency scores appears 
to be due to pure technical efficiency loss over time.  For example, acquirers and non-merging 
banks are wasting more inputs without enhancing the output level.  However, pure technical 
efficiency is still not enough to explain the cost efficiency loss reported in 1999 and thereafter. 
Figure 13:  The Non-parametric Pure Technical Efficiency Scores of Targets, Acquirers, 
and Control Banks 
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Table 9:  The Non-parametric Pure Technical Efficiency Scores of Targets, Acquirers, and Control Banks 
 
          
  Target   Acquirer   Control  
 Mean 
Standard 
Error Min Mean 
Standard 
Error Min Mean 
Standard 
Error Min 
1992 0.1769 0.0456 0.1411 0.6114 0.0698 0.4694 0.6370 0.1664 0.2453 
1993 0.3084 0.1735 0.1267 0.6247 0.1532 0.4083 0.5752 0.1476 0.2645 
1994 0.2354 0.1198 0.1583 0.5678 0.1287 0.3991 0.5207 0.1601 0.2843 
1995 0.2751 0.1037 0.1340 0.6003 0.1665 0.3437 0.5281 0.1665 0.3097 
1996 0.2403 0.0843 0.1265 0.5126 0.1582 0.3263 0.5120 0.1652 0.1804 
1997 0.2119 0.1388 0.0706 0.6306 0.1978 0.2953 0.5237 0.1625 0.2953 
1998 0.2195 0.1501 0.0963 0.5587 0.1744 0.3476 0.5105 0.1637 0.1036 
1999 0.3025 0.2136 0.0639 0.5133 0.1486 0.3048 0.4750 0.1808 0.1096 
2000 0.1531 0.1140 0.0377 0.4844 0.1775 0.2411 0.4228 0.1870 0.1279 
2001 0.2668 0.0858 0.0706 0.4409 0.1815 0.2972 0.4521 0.1711 0.0926 
2002 0.3368 0.0548 0.2856 0.3802 0.1037 0.2457 0.4350 0.1812 0.0944 
2003 0.4400 0.0348 0.1174 0.4808 0.1420 0.2997 0.4863 0.1633 0.1231 
 
The non-parametric pure technical efficiency (PTE) scores of targets, acquirers, and other non-merging banks.  The input-oriented PTE problem is solved 
according to Equation 3, assuming variable returns to scale.  The PTE scores presented in this table are obtained as follows: 
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PTE .  The PTE score is one for DMUs on the efficient frontier.  PTE scores take values in the range 
(0,1). 
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Table 10:  The Non-parametric Scale Efficiency Scores of Targets, Acquirers, and Other Non-merging Banks 
 
          
  Target   Acquirer   Control  
 Mean 
Standard 
Error Min Mean 
Standard 
Error Min Mean 
Standard 
Error Min 
1992 0.9429 0.0324 0.9073 0.9371 0.0757 0.8003 0.9166 0.1000 0.4799 
1993 0.8570 0.1286 0.5237 0.8375 0.1224 0.5237 0.8369 0.1333 0.3646 
1994 0.8684 0.1280 0.5061 0.8240 0.1473 0.5688 0.8870 0.1446 0.1932 
1995 0.8970 0.1144 0.5017 0.7617 0.1311 0.5434 0.8407 0.1473 0.2728 
1996 0.8723 0.1236 0.4155 0.8022 0.1361 0.5941 0.8238 0.1585 0.2849 
1997 0.8576 0.1201 0.4256 0.7742 0.1367 0.5019 0.8489 0.1488 0.2802 
1998 0.8931 0.1162 0.4454 0.8408 0.1364 0.5785 0.8680 0.1399 0.3292 
1999 0.8906 0.1253 0.4021 0.7729 0.1256 0.4764 0.8334 0.1497 0.2050 
2000 0.8316 0.1520 0.4764 0.7517 0.1877 0.4356 0.8409 0.1601 0.1290 
2001 0.8375 0.1394 0.4054 0.8609 0.1029 0.6044 0.8333 0.1504 0.3143 
2002 0.8753 0.0726 0.7456 0.8413 0.1341 0.5164 0.8062 0.1667 0.2052 
2003 0.8739 0.1492 0.4217 0.9445 0.1111 0.4864 0.8895 0.1290 0.2535 
 
The non-parametric scale efficiency (SE) scores of targets, acquirers, and other non-merging banks.  The input-oriented SE problem is solved by Equation 4, 
where 
PTE
TESE = , where TE is the technical efficiency score, and PTE is the pure technical efficiency score.  The SE score is one for DMUs on the efficient 
frontier.  SE scores take on values in the range (0,1).  
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Figure 14:  The Non-parametric Scale Efficiency Scores of Targets, Acquirers, and Control 
Banks 
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The last possible explanation of the cost efficiency trend is the loss in the allocative 
efficiency.  Table 11 reports the allocative efficiency for the three subsamples.  The results show 
that since 1992, acquirers have lost 32% (.96-.64)of their allocative efficiency, targets have lost 
23% (.99-.76), and non-merging banks have lost 28% (.97-.68).  This loss of allocative efficiency 
is significant enough to explain the cost efficiency loss.  Figure 16 shows the trend in allocative 
efficiency.  Figures 11 and 16 show that the trends of cost and allocative efficiency are similar.  
This result indicates that banks became less efficient in allocating their resources over time, and 
moved further and further away from achieving the optimal mix of inputs and outputs.  One 
explanation for this result is the implementation of the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act in 1997.  
Because of this new regulation, managers found themselves challenged with new investment 
choices that were not available before. 
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Table 11:  The Non-parametric Allocative Efficiency Scores of Targets, Acquirers, and Control Banks 
 
          
  Target   Acquirer   Control  
 Mean 
Standard 
Error Min Mean 
Standard 
Error Min Mean 
Standard 
Error Min 
1992 0.9902 0.0035 0.9833 0.9607 0.0654 0.8274 0.9693 0.0751 0.5406 
1993 0.9638 0.0652 0.6462 0.9626 0.0679 0.6462 0.9716 0.0595 0.4864 
1994 0.9494 0.0855 0.6811 0.9757 0.0395 0.7987 0.9343 0.1141 0.3748 
1995 0.9178 0.1156 0.5910 0.9890 0.0117 0.9455 0.9569 0.1002 0.1661 
1996 0.9655 0.0475 0.8119 0.9838 0.0242 0.9049 0.9673 0.0781 0.3302 
1997 0.9728 0.0693 0.6084 0.9249 0.0838 0.7237 0.9659 0.0672 0.3977 
1998 0.9642 0.0718 0.6234 0.9664 0.0642 0.7337 0.9616 0.0752 0.4318 
1999 0.9715 0.0386 0.8244 0.4788 0.2015 0.2105 0.5564 0.1637 0.1737 
2000 0.5083 0.1418 0.2537 0.3704 0.1794 0.1594 0.2823 0.1464 0.0251 
2001 0.2670 0.1210 0.1024 0.5936 0.1324 0.1273 0.6549 0.1248 0.1332 
2002 0.6081 0.1260 0.3295 0.7410 0.1358 0.5115 0.7759 0.1409 0.2788 
2003 0.7610 0.1423 0.3479 0.6453 0.1754 0.3592 0.6862 0.1499 0.2074 
          
 
The non-parametric allocative efficiency (AE) scores of targets, acquirers, and other non-merging banks.  The AE scores presented in this table are obtained by 
the following equation: 
TE
CEAEAETECE =⇒×=  where CE is the cost efficiency and TE is the technical efficiency.  The AE score is one for DMUs on the efficient frontier.  
AE scores take values in the range (0,1). 
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Figure 15:  The Non-parametric Allocative Efficiency Scores of Targets, Acquirers, and 
Control Banks 
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5.1.2.  Revenue Efficiency Results 
Revenue efficiency indicates how efficient the bank is in maximizing its output level, 
holding prices fixed.  Revenue efficiency results are presented in Table 12.  The results show that 
acquirers lost 11% (.56-.45) of their revenue efficiency between 1992 and 2003.  Similar results 
are reported for non-merging banks, who lost 18% (.42-.60), and for targets, who lost 32% (.61-
.29), during the same time period.  However, Figure 16 shows that acquirers have persistently 
higher efficiency scores than others.  As we mentioned in section 4.2, this revenue efficiency 
advantage may be due to the higher returns on other earning assets (investments) rather than 
higher interest charges on loans.  Figures 8 and 16 show this.  Furthermore, Figure 16 shows an 
interesting result about the management style of acquirers.  While targets and non-merging banks 
kept a smooth decreasing efficiency trend over time, acquirers were more active in enhancing 
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their product mix and waste rates.  This result can be considered as evidence of active 
management of acquiring banks. 
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Table 12:  The Non-parametric Revenue Efficiency Scores of Targets, Acquirers, and Other Non-merging Banks 
 
          
  Target   Acquirer   Control  
 Mean 
Standard 
Error Min Mean 
Standard 
Error Min Mean 
Standard 
Error Min 
1992 0.6116 0.0901 0.4858 0.5638 0.0928 0.4307 0.6034 0.1614 0.1631 
1993 0.4544 0.1214 0.1334 0.4797 0.1359 0.1334 0.4664 0.1630 0.1385 
1994 0.3965 0.1324 0.1133 0.5405 0.1194 0.3443 0.3977 0.1624 0.0839 
1995 0.4146 0.1640 0.2133 0.4896 0.1832 0.1308 0.3834 0.1702 0.0627 
1996 0.3324 0.1535 0.1308 0.3927 0.1580 0.1159 0.3787 0.1744 0.0827 
1997 0.3600 0.1475 0.1937 0.5378 0.1905 0.2362 0.3761 0.1679 0.1152 
1998 0.3357 0.0997 0.2123 0.4937 0.1734 0.2280 0.3742 0.1622 0.0417 
1999 0.3328 0.1066 0.1998 0.4924 0.1609 0.2096 0.3662 0.1766 0.0508 
2000 0.3700 0.1485 0.2041 0.4540 0.2050 0.1624 0.3280 0.1736 0.0381 
2001 0.3084 0.1699 0.1269 0.3517 0.1276 0.2142 0.3545 0.1505 0.0653 
2002 0.2856 0.0451 0.2101 0.3676 0.1005 0.2253 0.3328 0.1720 0.0291 
2003 0.2920 0.0803 0.1557 0.4494 0.1122 0.3198 0.4153 0.1553 0.0150 
          
The non-parametric revenue efficiency scores of targets, acquirers, and other non-merging banks. The revenue maximization problem is solved according to 
Equation 6.  The revenue efficiency scores presented in this table are obtained by the following equation: 
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virtual efficiency profit that could be achieved if the DMU lies on the efficient frontier.  The profit efficiency scores take values in the range (0, 1).  
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Figure 16:  The Non-parametric Revenue Efficiency Scores of Targets, Acquirers, and 
Control Banks 
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5.1.3.  Profit Efficiency Results 
As mentioned earlier, profit efficiency is the most demanding efficiency measure since it 
seeks to minimize costs and maximize revenues simultaneously by allowing inputs and outputs 
to vary throughout the optimization process.  The results for this section are presented in Table 
13 and shown in Figure 17.  The results show that acquirers lost 4% (.41-.37) of their profit 
efficiency during the study period.  Targets and non-merging banks suffered efficiency 
reductions of 18% (.41-.23) and 16% (.49-.33), respectively.  Figure 17 shows the decreasing 
profit efficiency trend over time.  A comparison of Figures 16 and 17 indicates that profit 
maximization is almost equivalent to revenue efficiency maximization.  Acquirers maximize the 
output level of a given input level with little cost minimization enhancement. 
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Table 13:  The Non-parametric Profit Efficiency Scores of Targets, Acquirers, and Control Banks 
 
The non-parametric profit efficiency scores of targets, acquirers, and other non-merging banks.  The profit maximization problem is solved according to Equation 
7.  The profit efficiency scores presented in this table are obtained by the following equation: 
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  Target   Acquirer   Control  
 Mean 
Standard 
Error Min Mean 
Standard 
Error Min Mean 
Standard 
Error Min 
1992 0.4164 0.0979 0.3032 0.4145 0.0655 0.3125 0.4972 0.2082 0.0915 
1993 0.3667 0.1447 0.2011 0.4189 0.1815 0.2022 0.3754 0.1774 0.1162 
1994 0.2880 0.1133 0.1021 0.4469 0.1285 0.2551 0.3203 0.1842 0.0649 
1995 0.3422 0.2056 0.1538 0.4023 0.2051 0.1765 0.3004 0.1951 0.0705 
1996 0.2681 0.1958 0.1411 0.3203 0.1720 0.0639 0.2871 0.1886 0.0608 
1997 0.2736 0.1660 0.1267 0.4557 0.2557 0.1759 0.2847 0.1871 0.0795 
1998 0.2651 0.1611 0.1340 0.3980 0.2090 0.1943 0.2799 0.1822 0.0277 
1999 0.2343 0.0763 0.1630 0.3657 0.1463 0.1561 0.2677 0.1990 0.0300 
2000 0.2512 0.1328 0.1265 0.3223 0.1719 0.1105 0.2205 0.1910 0.0273 
2001 0.2074 0.1829 0.0706 0.2688 0.1842 0.1431 0.2402 0.1746 0.0041 
2002 0.1739 0.0377 0.0963 0.2792 0.0881 0.1676 0.2530 0.1882 -0.0239 
2003 0.2320 0.1700 0.0987 0.3753 0.1592 0.2293 0.3347 0.1710 -0.0083 
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Figure 17:  The Non-parametric Profit Efficiency Scores of Targets, Acquirers, and Control 
Banks 
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In general, the results show that efficiency measures decrease over time.  However, 
acquirers maintained the highest average cost, revenue, and profit efficiencies.  This trend may 
account for the latest merger wave, which according to Floegel et al. (2005),8 started in late 
1997.  Using efficiency scores to explain merger waves could be a subject for future research. 
 
5.2.  The Post- Merger Efficiency Dynamics 
In this section, we discuss the efficiency development of merging and non- merging 
banks of different sizes following the merger event.  To evaluate the efficiency development, we 
compare the efficiency scores of each bank in the year preceding the  merger with each of the 
four following years’ efficiency scores.  To control for the size effect, we define large banks as 
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those banks with total assets greater than the median of the whole sample, including control 
banks, one year after the merger.  Furthermore, we compare the performance of large and small 
non-merging banks with the performance of merging banks of different sizes.  All efficiency 
results are represented in Tables 14 through 20.  The efficiency changes relative to the year of 
merger are reported in Columns 4 and 9 for small and large banks combined with their peer 
banks.  Each year’s performance of the acquirers following the merger event is compared with 
the performance of their peer group to check if acquirers are still performing better than non-
merging banks after the merger event.  The results of the later comparison are reported in the 
bottom part of each efficiency table. 
 
5.2.1.  Profit Efficiency Changes 
Table 14 presents the profit efficiency changes for acquirers for the four years following 
the merger.  The results show that small banks experienced gradual statistically significant losses 
following the merger, losing around 11.7% in four years.  However, control banks of the same 
size experienced a statistically significant average gain of 11.6% over the same period.  On the 
other hand, large banks experienced a 2.1% statistically insignificant efficiency loss in the four 
years following the merger compared with a 7.5% statistically significant efficiency 
improvement for control banks.  Furthermore, we compared merging and non-merging banks’ 
performance for each year starting from the merger year.  The results are reported in Columns 1 
and 6.  Starting with small banks, we can see that small merging banks kept outperforming other 
banks of the same size with decreasing margin over the first two years, but then underperformed 
their peer banks by a statistically significant 13.5% in the fourth year.  This result indicates that  
                                                                                                                                                             
8 Floegel et al. (2005) studied  mergers that took place between 1993 and 2002.  Their results show that the early 
mergers (1992-1998) kept bidders with 1.556% average abnormal returns but, the late stage of merger wave kept 
 63
small merging banks had lost their profit efficiency comparative advantage following the 
mergers.  The results are different for large banks, which had insignificant efficiency losses and 
maintained greater profit efficiency than their peers.  However, the profit efficiency difference 
between large merging and non-merging banks decreased from 14.9% in the merger year to 5.3% 
in the fourth year following the merger event. 
 
5.2.2.  Cost Efficiency Changes 
Table 15 presents the cost efficiency dynamics of acquiring banks and their peers.  The 
results show that small merging banks lost about 7.7% of their cost efficiency in the four years 
following the merger event compared with an average efficiency gain of 10.0% for their peers. 
Small merging banks maintained higher cost efficiencies over their peers for the whole period, 
but in decreasing margins.  Large merging banks, on the other hand, experienced insignificant 
losses in the four years following the merger event compared with a significant efficiency gain of 
6.4% for their peers.  Again, large acquirers maintained higher efficiencies than their peers. 
Because the cost efficiency concept is a product of technical, pure technical, scale, and 
allocative efficiencies, the results of these efficiency scores are presented in this section.  The 
technical efficiency results are presented in Table 16.  The results look very similar to the results 
of the preceding sections. Large acquirers experienced insignificant efficiency losses during the 
four years after the merger, but maintained superior technical efficiency over their peers.  Small 
acquirers also experienced a significant loss of 5.6% during the four years following the merger 
compared with a significant efficiency gain of 7.9% for their peers.  Indeed, small acquirers were 
outperformed by their peers by the fourth year following the merger event.  In general, this result 
means that large acquirers’ ability to maximize their outputs given fixed inputs is best relative to 
                                                                                                                                                             
them with -1.1079% average abnormal returns.  
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merging and non-merging banks of different sizes.  As expected, the pure technical efficiency 
results look just the same as the results of the technical efficiency results.  This is expected 
because changing the CRS assumption to a VRS assumption will not change the ranking of 
banks included in the efficient frontier.  The pure technical efficiency results are shown in Table 
17. 
Scale efficiency results are reported in Table 18.  The results show that small banks 
experienced insignificant gains of 1.3% in the fourth year compared with 4.6% significant gains 
for their peers.  However, there is no clear trend indicated when comparing acquirers with their 
peers on an annual basis.  Generally, acquirers outperformed their peers for the first three years, 
but not the fourth year.  Large banks, on the other hand, experienced insignificant gains in scale 
efficiency in the fourth year after significant losses of 3.5% and 3.9% in the first and second 
year, respectively.  The large bank peer group gained 8.6% by the fourth year, which enabled 
then to outperform large acquirers in terms of scale efficiency.  These results indicate that the 
higher cost and profit efficiency scores of large acquirers is coming from the pricing policy of 
their inputs and outputs rather than from efficiency in their use of inputs.  The results are 
inconsistent with Akhavein et al. (1997), who conclude that anti-trust law prevents large banks 
from exercising market power.   
Finally, allocative efficiency results are shown in Table 19.  The results show that small 
banks experienced insignificant losses of 1.9% four years after the merger compared with a 
significant efficiency improvement of 30.3% for their peers. However, small acquirers ranked 
lower than their peers starting from the second year.  Large merging banks also experienced a 
significant loss of 11.7% by the fourth year versus an insignificant loss by their peers.  Anyway, 
this efficiency loss didn’t affect the superiority of large banks over all other groups.  Comparing 
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the scale efficiency results with these results provides a further interesting conclusion.  Large 
acquirers are more efficient in constructing an optimal product mix, given their respective prices, 
and consequently they are more cost efficient than others.  As mentioned earlier, the source of 
the higher allocative efficiency is mostly derived from their being more engaged in non-
traditional banking.  This conclusion is further supported by the small banks’ efficiency loss after 
merger.  We argue that small acquirers were challenged by creating new investment 
opportunities. 
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Table 14:  Profit Efficiency Improvement During the Four Years After Merger of Small and Large Banks Compared With 
Control Banks  
  
                                  Profit Efficiency 
                                                                                      Small      Large 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
    Mean variance Z-value difference t-stat Mean variance Z-value difference t-stat 
  t 0.355 0.035 9.648     0.381 0.033 10.763     
  t+1 0.291 0.026 9.163 -0.065 -1.819 0.367 0.032 10.424 -0.014 -0.890
Acquirers t+2 0.307 0.031 8.866 -0.049 -1.590 0.372 0.038 9.677 -0.010 -0.560
  t+3 0.256 0.012 11.999 -0.099 -2.808 0.366 0.046 8.734 -0.015 -0.417
  t+4 0.238 0.004 18.300 -0.117 -4.700 0.360 0.057 7.690 -0.021 -0.898
                        
  t 0.257 0.046 6.891     0.233 0.060 5.451     
  t+1 0.224 0.010 13.120 -0.033 -2.668 0.209 0.011 11.547 -0.024 -1.716
Control Banks t+2 0.246 0.045 6.671 -0.011 -0.896 0.224 0.058 5.348 -0.008 -0.607
  t+3 0.272 0.071 5.857 0.016 0.869 0.246 0.101 4.442 0.013 0.618 
  t+4 0.373 0.075 7.812 0.116 5.770 0.308 0.119 5.113 0.075 3.022 
     difference  t-stat        difference  t-stat       
 t 0.099 6.576       0.149 9.255       
Acquirers Compared  t+1 0.067 6.739       0.158 14.477       
With Control Banks  t+2 0.061 4.204       0.147 8.997       
  t+3 -0.016 -1.052       0.121 5.970       
  t+4 -0.135 -9.086       0.053 2.380       
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Table 15:  Cost Efficiency Improvement During the Four Years After Merger of Small and Large Banks Compared With 
Control Banks 
 
                                        Cost Efficiency 
                                                                                      Small     Large 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
    Mean variance Z-value difference t-stat Mean variance Z-value difference t-stat 
  t 0.553 0.019 20.443     0.504 0.022 17.511     
  t+1 0.446 0.014 19.265 -0.107 -4.110 0.478 0.022 16.362 -0.026 -0.890
Acquirers t+2 0.467 0.038 12.298 -0.087 -3.873 0.486 0.036 13.150 -0.017 -0.560
  t+3 0.433 0.027 13.458 -0.120 -3.103 0.484 0.040 12.406 -0.020 -0.417
  t+4 0.476 0.013 21.229 -0.077 -2.047 0.456 0.050 10.434 -0.048 -0.898
                        
  t 0.255 0.028 8.750     0.231 0.035 7.120     
  t+1 0.128 0.026 4.593 -0.127 -10.418 0.125 0.029 4.251 -0.106 -9.789
Control Banks t+2 0.297 0.026 10.544 0.043 3.560 0.259 0.034 8.140 0.028 0.358 
  t+3 0.343 0.033 10.943 0.089 6.933 0.288 0.044 7.873 0.056 2.235 
  t+4 0.355 0.044 9.739 0.100 6.860 0.296 0.062 6.812 0.065 2.409 
     difference  t-stat        difference  t-stat       
 t 0.299 26.114       0.273 21.790       
Acquirers Compared  t+1 0.319 30.445       0.353 29.720       
With Control Banks  t+2 0.170 12.732       0.227 16.377       
  t+3 0.090 6.999       0.197 12.895       
  t+4 0.122 9.697       0.160 9.077       
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Table 16:  Technical Efficiency Improvement During the Four Years After Merger of Small and Large Banks Compared With 
Control Banks 
 
                                    Technical Efficiency 
                                                        Small     Large 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
    Mean variance Z-value difference t-stat Mean variance Z-value difference t-stat 
  t 0.484 0.019 17.751     0.472 0.016 18.807     
  t+1 0.478 0.017 18.522 -0.006 -0.238 0.442 0.015 18.678 -0.030 -1.158
Acquirers t+2 0.488 0.019 18.160 0.004 0.176 0.451 0.024 14.744 -0.021 -0.827
  t+3 0.431 0.003 39.666 -0.053 -1.925 0.459 0.033 12.838 -0.013 -0.317
  t+4 0.428 0.003 39.105 -0.056 -4.431 0.471 0.042 11.779 -0.001 0.045 
                        
  t 0.425 0.020 17.258     0.326 0.027 11.401     
  t+1 0.378 0.022 14.653 -0.048 -4.440 0.305 0.029 10.305 -0.021 -1.669
Control Banks t+2 0.411 0.024 15.368 -0.015 -1.316 0.321 0.032 10.290 -0.005 -0.399
  t+3 0.373 0.029 12.478 -0.053 -4.352 0.304 0.040 8.699 -0.022 -1.567
  t+4 0.504 0.043 13.941 0.079 5.532 0.358 0.069 7.830 0.032 1.843 
     difference  t-stat        difference  t-stat       
 t 0.059 5.609       0.146 13.270       
Acquirers Compared  t+1 0.100 9.602       0.137 12.436       
With Control Banks  t+2 0.078 7.160       0.130 10.410       
  t+3 0.059 6.167       0.155 10.862       
  t+4 -0.076 -6.735       0.113 6.441       
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Table 17:  Pure Technical Efficiency Improvement During the Four Years Following Merger of Small and Large Banks 
Compared With Control Banks 
 
                                               Pure Technical Efficiency 
                                        Small          Large 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
    Mean variance Z-value difference t-stat Mean variance Z-value difference t-stat 
  t 0.587 0.032 16.837     0.564 0.026 17.909     
  t+1 0.536 0.021 19.103 -0.050 -1.495 0.555 0.026 17.615 -0.009 -0.248 
Acquirers t+2 0.545 0.023 18.534 -0.042 -1.541 0.569 0.036 15.345 0.005 0.209 
  t+3 0.489 0.010 24.670 -0.097 -3.242 0.563 0.034 15.636 -0.001 0.019 
  t+4 0.505 0.010 25.242 -0.081 -3.508 0.552 0.046 13.174 -0.013 -0.205 
                        
  t 0.533 0.054 13.151     0.369 0.093 6.955     
  t+1 0.472 0.070 10.261 -0.061 -3.285 0.351 0.120 5.826 -0.018 -0.728 
Control Banks t+2 0.512 0.062 11.776 -0.021 -1.117 0.364 0.108 6.361 -0.005 -0.199 
  t+3 0.486 0.080 9.840 -0.047 -2.381 0.358 0.144 5.421 -0.011 -0.412 
  t+4 0.586 0.071 12.644 0.052 2.557 0.381 0.134 5.976 0.012 0.428 
     difference  t-stat        difference  t-stat       
 t 0.053 3.461       0.195 10.750       
 Acquirers Compared t+1 0.064 4.051       0.204 10.142       
  With Control Banks t+2 0.033 2.157       0.205 10.264       
  t+3 0.004 0.227       0.205 9.236       
  t+4 -0.080 -5.353       0.171 7.645       
                        
 
 
 
 70
Table 18:  Scale Efficiency Improvement During the Four Years Following Merger of Small and Large Banks Compared With 
Control Banks 
 
                                    Scale Efficiency 
                                                             Small      Large 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
    Mean variance Z-value difference t-stat Mean variance Z-value difference t-stat 
  t 0.848 0.020 30.838     0.847 0.012 40.105     
  t+1 0.902 0.013 39.714 0.054 2.037 0.812 0.018 31.162 -0.035 -1.625
Acquirers t+2 0.905 0.009 49.158 0.057 2.594 0.808 0.017 31.930 -0.039 -1.467
  t+3 0.899 0.011 44.099 0.051 2.712 0.823 0.022 28.254 -0.025 -0.767
  t+4 0.861 0.010 44.749 0.013 0.566 0.861 0.013 38.765 0.014 0.431 
                        
  t 0.876 0.056 21.319     0.816 0.022 19.987     
  t+1 0.886 0.067 19.708 0.010 0.526 0.836 0.054 20.458 0.020 1.351 
Control Banks t+2 0.882 0.058 20.997 0.005 0.290 0.854 0.029 20.884 0.038 2.479 
  t+3 0.856 0.074 18.113 -0.021 -1.076 0.807 0.072 12.040 -0.010 -0.567
  t+4 0.922 0.042 25.820 0.046 2.554 0.902 0.088 20.238 0.086 4.072 
     difference  t-stat        difference  t-stat       
 t -0.029 -1.976       0.031 3.173       
Acquirers Compared t+1 0.016 1.046       -0.024 -1.703       
 With Control Banks  t+2 0.023 1.664       -0.046 -4.109       
  t+3 0.043 2.794       0.016 0.972       
  t+4 -0.061 -5.090       -0.042 -2.487       
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Table 19:  Allocative Efficiency Improvement During the Four Years After Merger of Small and Large Banks Compared With 
Control Banks 
 
Allocative Efficiency 
                                                                  Small       Large 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
    Mean variance Z-value difference t-stat Mean variance Z-value difference t-stat 
 t 0.960 0.006 60.984     0.908 0.032 25.886     
 t+1 0.858 0.043 21.194 -0.101 -6.679 0.874 0.050 19.931 -0.035 -0.963
Acquirers t+2 0.857 0.074 16.107 -0.103 -2.623 0.856 0.060 17.888 -0.053 -1.157
 t+3 0.869 0.066 17.269 -0.090 -1.660 0.839 0.067 16.471 -0.070 -1.185
 t+4 0.941 0.015 38.729 -0.019 -0.313 0.792 0.056 17.075 -0.117 -1.733
                       
 t 0.675 0.052 16.976     0.388 0.099 7.092     
 t+1 0.304 0.044 8.305 -0.371 -22.660 0.264 0.061 6.155 -0.124 -5.884
Control Banks t+2 0.899 0.024 33.167 0.224 16.220 0.379 0.044 10.409 -0.008 -0.493
 t+3 .9450 0.059 29.686 0.576 37.954 0.294 0.161 4.208 -0.094 -3.930
 t+4 0.978 0.059 23.229 0.303 16.793 0.370 0.138 5.715 -0.018 -0.618
    difference  t-stat        difference  t-stat      
 t 0.2840 22.283       0.521 27.354       
Acquirers Compared t+1 0.5540 35.658       0.610 34.796       
With Control Banks t+2 -0.042 -2.553       0.477 28.141       
 t+3 -0.076 -20.544       0.545 21.643       
 t+4 -0.037 -2.596       0.422 18.179       
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5.2.3.  Revenue Efficiency Changes 
Table 20 presents the revenue efficiency results of the merging and peer banks.  The 
results show that small acquiring banks experienced a statistically significant loss of 7.6 % by the 
fourth year versus an 8.8% significant gain for their peers.  The results further show that 
acquirers lost their superiority after the second year to their peers, who experience a 12.9% 
higher efficiency by the fourth year.  Large acquirers also experienced a 2.5% insignificant loss 
versus a 3.7% significant gain for their peers, but they continued to exceed the efficiency of their 
peers by over 5.4%.  This result supports our argument that acquirers exercise market power in 
setting prices. 
 
5.3.  Malmquist Total Productivity Index 
Considering the merger year as the base year, Table 21 presents the Malmquist total 
productivity index results of merging banks and their peers.  The table also shows the two main 
components of the Malmquist index, the efficiency change and the frontier shift for each group.  
Starting with the index itself, the results show that large merging banks tend to have the 
highest scores compared with all other groups.  However, control banks achieved higher total 
productivity than merging banks in the third year following the merger.  The source of the higher 
productivity seems to be the efficiency change rather than the frontier shift.  Column 3 in Table 
24 presents the efficiency change for all groups.  However, large merging banks experienced 
higher efficiency improvements for the first two years after the merger than other groups, but 
experienced lower efficiency improvements than their peers by the third year.  The frontier shift 
is presented in Column 5 of Table 21.  All values in the frontier shift, or technology change, are 
less than one.  This means that the frontier is moving to the right, or that the whole sector, on 
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Table 20:  Revenue Efficiency Improvement During the Four Years After Merger of Small and Large Banks Compared With 
Control Banks 
 
Revenue Efficiency 
                                                                                                  Small                                            Large 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
    Mean variance Z-value difference t-stat Mean variance Z-value difference t-stat 
  t 0.426 0.020 15.549     0.428 0.019 15.640     
  t+1 0.365 0.013 16.540 -0.061 -2.303 0.441 0.022 15.090 0.014 0.507 
Acquirers t+2 0.385 0.020 13.925 -0.041 -1.917 0.430 0.023 14.340 0.002 0.100 
  t+3 0.385 0.016 15.429 -0.042 -1.475 0.424 0.024 14.099 -0.004 -0.090 
  t+4 0.350 0.010 17.708 -0.076 -2.601 0.403 0.023 13.485 -0.025 -0.609 
                        
  t 0.388 0.039 11.211     0.313 0.057 7.528     
  t+1 0.351 0.048 9.216 -0.037 -2.350 0.295 0.069 6.443 -0.018 -0.963 
Control Banks t+2 0.387 0.038 11.472 -0.001 -0.032 0.311 0.054 7.703 -0.002 -0.092 
  t+3 0.365 0.056 8.831 -0.023 -1.431 0.302 0.084 5.977 -0.011 -0.552 
  t+4 0.476 0.055 11.698 0.088 5.039 0.349 0.090 6.705 0.037 1.671 
     difference  t-stat        difference  t-stat       
 t 0.039 3.018       0.115 7.913       
 Acquirers Compared t+1 0.014 1.110       0.147 9.217       
With Control Banks  t+2 -0.002 -0.135       0.119 8.152       
  t+3 0.020 1.417       0.122 7.063       
  t+4 -0.126 -9.369       0.054 3.049       
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Table 21:  Malmquist Productivity Index of Merging Large and Small Banks Compared With Control Banks 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
    Malmquist variance Efficiency Change variance Frontier Shift variance Improved Lost % Improved
Large Merging Banks t+1 1.004 0.007 1.052 0.019 0.964 0.009 42 58 0.420 
  t+2 1.003 0.022 1.078 0.061 0.953 0.018 42 64 0.396 
  t+3 1.006 0.024 1.075 0.061 0.963 0.026 50 59 0.459 
Large Control Banks t+1 0.993 0.021 1.043 0.036 0.963 0.011 186 213 0.466 
  t+2 0.998 0.044 1.083 0.075 0.942 0.021 198 269 0.424 
  t+3 1.015 0.071 1.099 0.114 0.955 0.035 228 316 0.419 
Small Merging Banks t+1 0.983 0.015 1.040 0.031 0.958 0.014 45 50 0.369 
  t+2 0.971 0.027 1.034 0.059 0.964 0.026 41 78 0.336 
  t+3 1.011 0.102 1.129 0.170 0.924 0.031 46 76 0.377 
Small Control Banks t+1 0.994 0.017 1.055 0.031 0.954 0.011 185 333 0.357 
  t+2 0.997 0.036 1.089 0.068 0.938 0.022 193 339 0.363 
  t+3 1.019 0.047 1.124 0.092 0.938 0.034 138 189 0.422 
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average, used more inputs to generate a given level of output.  However, the portion of 
large merging banks that experienced higher productivity three years after their mergers is about 
46% compared with 42% of their peers. 
Small merging banks, on the other hand, experienced lower productivity than their peers.  
However, the trend of both groups’ Malmquist index was similar.  Both experienced productivity 
losses in the first two years after merger, but then experienced 1.1% and 1.9% productivity 
improvements for merging and control banks, respectively.  The source of the productivity 
improvement is the efficiency change rather than the technology shock (frontier shift).  Column 
3 shows that small merging banks experienced a 12.9% efficiency improvement versus 12.4% 
for their peers.  However, the portion of small acquirers who experienced efficiency gains is 
37.7% compared with 42.2% for their peers. 
To check the distributional characteristics of the Malmquist productivity index, we 
applied the bootstrapping technique.  We allowed every sample to contain 60% of the whole 
sample of each group (small banks and their peers, and large banks and their peers).  We further 
generated 65,000 subsamples to get the distributional statistics of each group.  The results are 
shown in Table 22 and in Figures 18 through 25.  Figures 18 and 19 show the time trend of the 
Malmquist productivity index of large merging banks and their peers.  Figure 18 shows that peer 
banks experienced gains for three continuous years, while Figure 19 shows that large acquirers 
experienced very slight productivity improvements in the two years after merger. 
Figures 20 and 21 show the productivity index distributions of small acquirers and their 
peers.  Acquirers experienced a negative distributional shift in the first year following the 
merger, but a positive shift one year later, while their peers achieved continuous productivity 
improvement.  Furthermore, we compared merging banks with their peers one and three years 
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Table 22:  The Distributions of Malmquist Productivity Index of Merging Large and Small Banks Compared With Control 
Banks 
Panel A 
  Large Merging Banks Large Control Banks 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 
Mean 0.993 0.986 0.992 0.986 0.989 1.009 
Percentile 2.5% 0.977 0.958 0.963 0.978 0.978 0.995 
Percentile 97.5% 1.010 1.018 1.023 0.994 1.002 1.024 
Median 0.993 0.985 0.992 0.986 0.989 1.009 
Sdev 0.008 0.015 0.016 0.004 0.006 0.007 
1st Quartile 0.988 0.975 0.982 0.983 0.985 1.004 
3rd Quartile 0.999 0.996 1.002 0.989 0.993 1.013 
 
Panel B 
 Small Merging Banks Small Control Banks 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 
Mean 0.971 0.953 0.979 0.995 1.003 1.003 
Percentile 2.5% 0.949 0.926 0.948 0.986 0.989 0.988 
Percentile 97.5% 0.993 0.98 1.011 1.005 1.019 1.019 
Median 0.971 0.953 0.979 0.995 1.003 1.003 
Sdev 0.011 0.014 0.016 0.005 0.008 0.008 
1st Quartile 0.964 0.944 0.968 0.992 0.998 0.998 
3rd Quartile 0.979 0.962 0.99 0.999 1.008 1.008 
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Figure 18: The distribution of Malmquist productivity index of large non-merging banks. 
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The distribution of malmquist productivity index of large non-merging banks.
 
 
Figure 19: The distribution of Malmquist productivity index of large merging banks for the 
three years following the merger event 
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The distribution of malmquist efficiency index of large merging banks for the three years following
the merger event.
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Figure 20: The distribution of Malmquist productivity index of small merging banks for the 
three years following the merger event 
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the merger event.
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: The distribution of Malmquist efficiency index of small Control banks 
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following the merger.  Figures 22 and 23 show that small peer banks’ distribution is located in 
the upper tail of small merging banks.  Large merging banks’ distributions and those of their 
peers are presented in Figures 24 and 25, respectively.  Merging banks’ productivity index 
distribution one year after the merger was more dispersed relative to that of their peers.  This 
result shows that merging banks of large size were more productive than others.  This result 
changed by the third year, when the non-merging banks’ distribution became located in the upper 
tail of merging banks’ distribution. 
 
5.4.  Classifying Merger Deals 
Table 23 shows the subsample classification along with the number of mergers for each 
classification and the method of payment used in merger deals.  The table shows that when 
mergers involve acquirers and targets from the same level of efficiency, mergers are most often 
paid with cash.  Of 64 mergers paid fully by cash in our sample, 56 involved acquirers and 
targets with the same efficiency classification.  In percentages, HEHE, MEME, and LELE 
mergers were 32%, 31%, and 36% financed with cash, respectively.  These are the highest 
percentage cash deals in the table.  This result supports the information asymmetry hypothesis, 
which argues that bidders will use stock-for-stock deals rather than cash deals when they 
recognize that their equity stocks are overvalued.  However, this result shows that parties with 
the same performance level can fairly evaluate each other, but other merger parties working in 
different efficiency levels are less able to observe the real value of the bidder’s equity value. 
 
 
 
 80
 
Figure 22: A comparison between the mamlmquist productivity index of small merging 
banks and their peers three years following the merger event 
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Figure 23: A comparison between the mamlmquist productivity index of small merging 
banks and their peers one year following the merger event 
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A comparison between the malmquist index of small merging banks and the peer group one 
year after merger.
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Figure24: A comparison between the mamlmquist productivity index of large merging 
banks and their peers one year following the merger event 
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Figure25: A comparison between the mamlmquist productivity index of large merging 
banks and their peers three years following the merger event 
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Table 23:  The Pair-Wise Profit Efficiency Merger Classifications, 1991-2002 
 
High efficiency/high efficiency (HEHE); high efficiency/medium efficiency (HEME); high efficiency/low 
efficiency (HELE); medium efficiency/high efficiency (MEHE); medium efficiency/medium efficiency (MEME); 
medium efficiency/low efficiency (MELE); low efficiency/high efficiency (LEHE); low efficiency/medium 
efficiency (LEME); and low efficiency/low efficiency (LELE). 
 
5.5.  Profit Efficiency Changes of Merger Combinations 
The main objective of this section is to investigate the profit efficiency dynamics of each 
of the nine merger combinations.  Furthermore, this section’s results are to be compared with the 
market reaction of each merger combination.  It is expected, according to the efficient markets 
hypothesis, that the economic gains arising from mergers will be accurately impounded into 
stock prices at the time of the merger announcement.  According to the value additivity principle 
(VAP) (see Haley and Schell, 1979), the “economic gains” are observed as the expected future 
cash flows of the merger.  The argument we are expressing here is that higher profit efficiency 
will be related to higher future cash flows.  Hence, any merger deal followed by profit efficiency 
gains is expected to generate more cash flows, which in turn, will be impounded into the stock 
price.  Accordingly, we present the profit efficiency dynamics of our nine efficiency merger 
combinations.  Table 24 presents the profit efficiency scores of the nine merger combinations up 
  Number    (%)  
 Cash Only Stock only Combination Total  Cash Only Stock Only Combination
HEHE 8 15 2 25 0.32 0.60 0.08 
HEME 0 46 2 48 0.00 0.96 0.04 
HELE 0 21 7 28 0.00 0.75 0.25 
MEHE 1 5 2 8 0.13 0.63 0.25 
MEME 35 66 12 114 0.31 0.58 0.11 
MELE 4 58 23 85 0.05 0.68 0.27 
LEHE 1 0 2 3 0.33 0.00 0.67 
LEME 2 5 5 12 0.17 0.42 0.42 
LELE 13 17 6 36 0.36 0.47 0.17 
Total 64 233 61 359 0.18 0.65 0.17 
  
 Table 24:  The Profit Efficiency Changes of the Pair-wise Efficiency Merger Combinations During the Four Years Following 
Merger 
 
                                     Profit Efficiency                       Efficiency Change 
    t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4   t+1-t t+2-t t+3-t t+4-t 
HEHE mean 0.696 0.629 0.590 0.455 0.426 Mean -0.067 -0.106 -0.220 -0.327 
  variance 0.036 0.075 0.079 0.054 0.055 Variance 0.019 0.018 0.059 0.061 
  z-score 14.200 8.892 8.140 6.508 5.433 t-stat -1.911 -3.042 -2.988 -4.397 
HELE mean 0.652 0.569 0.556 0.521 0.403 Mean -0.083 -0.140 -0.209 -0.472 
  variance 0.042 0.068 0.051 0.074 0.011 Variance 0.009 0.059 0.075 0.030 
  z-score 9.582 6.538 6.050 4.278 6.679 t-stat -2.640 -1.421 -1.710 -4.734 
HEME mean 0.682 0.644 0.604 0.573 0.696 Mean -0.037 -0.070 -0.108 -0.014 
  variance 0.033 0.027 0.035 0.034 0.054 Variance 0.009 0.015 0.024 0.016 
  z-score 15.116 15.689 12.470 10.320 8.433 t-stat -1.597 -2.237 -2.282 -0.325 
LEHE mean 0.194 0.165 0.209 0.177 0.186 Mean -0.029 0.015 -0.019 -0.010 
  variance 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000 Variance 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.000 
  z-score 65.651 7.697 7.817 6.935 20.966 t-stat -1.449 0.560 -0.860 -0.821 
LELE mean 0.184 0.189 0.239 0.218 0.174 Mean 0.005 0.055 0.040 0.003 
  variance 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.009 Variance 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.006 
  z-score 17.048 18.861 18.117 13.174 4.007 t-stat 0.793 4.052 2.123 0.079 
LEME mean 0.185 0.205 0.236 0.243 0.253 Mean 0.020 0.051 0.041 0.036 
  variance 0.005 0.009 0.011 0.006 0.004 Variance 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.007 
  z-score 9.840 7.986 8.215 9.045 9.957 t-stat 0.921 1.971 1.180 1.030 
MEHE mean 0.297 0.279 0.284 0.356 0.367 Mean -0.018 -0.013 0.023 0.033 
  variance 0.006 0.018 0.027 0.038 0.069 Variance 0.003 0.008 0.014 0.035 
  z-score 8.471 4.709 3.841 3.186 2.410 t-stat -0.685 -0.322 0.334 0.304 
MELE mean 0.294 0.297 0.311 0.289 0.306 Mean 0.003 0.011 -0.012 -0.002 
  variance 0.006 0.007 0.020 0.023 0.029 Variance 0.002 0.011 0.013 0.020 
  z-score 24.212 21.854 12.789 10.010 8.050 t-stat 0.416 0.630 -0.565 -0.067 
MEME mean 0.315 0.294 0.306 0.294 0.295 Mean -0.021 -0.011 -0.020 -0.027 
  variance 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.014 0.016 Variance 0.003 0.010 0.012 0.009 
  z-score 27.68067 25.57195 21.58414 16.72359 14.49168 t-stat -3.00033 -0.84726 -1.24326 -1.732 
 to four years following the merger event.  The results show that most acquirers 
experienced efficiency losses after merger, except for three merger combinations: 1) LELE 
mergers experienced statistically significant efficiency improvements of 5.5% and 4%, 
respectively, in the second and third year following the merger.  However, the efficiency gains 
weren’t significant for the first and fourth year after the merger; 2) LEME mergers experienced 
persistent positive efficiency improvements over time, but they only experienced statistically 
significant improvement after the second year; 3) MEHE mergers experienced insignificant 
efficiency improvement for the whole period.  These mergers account for 15.6% of our whole 
sample.  According to these results, we expect the above mentioned merger combinations to 
experience positive or at least higher merger returns upon the merger announcement. 
On the other hand, all other merger combinations experienced efficiency losses over time.  
The two merger combinations with the most extreme efficiency loss were:  1) HEHE mergers, 
which suffered a 32.6% loss in profit efficiency by the fourth year following the merger; and 2) 
HELE mergers, which suffered a 47% loss in profit efficiency by the fourth year following the 
merger.  These two extremes account for 14.7% of the total sample.  
Other merger combinations experienced about a 2% efficiency loss by the fourth year.  
MELE and MEME mergers combined account for 55.5% of merger deals.  These subsamples 
experienced 2% and 3% efficiency losses, respectively, by the fourth year.  Based on these 
results, we expect that the market reaction will be negative upon merger announcement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 5.6.  Conclusions 
Applying the non-parametric data envelopment approach, we estimated the cost, revenue, 
and profit efficiency scores of merging and non-merging U.S. banks over the time period from 
1992 to 2003.  On average, acquirers have 1.65% and 2% cost efficiency advantages over targets 
and non-merging banks, respectively.  To understand the source of this advantage, we 
decomposed the cost efficiency into its technical, pure technical, scale, and allocative efficiency 
components.  We found that allocative efficiency is the main source of the higher cost efficiency 
of acquirers over their peers, especially during the 1990s. 
We further investigated the post-merger efficiency dynamics for the four years following 
the merger event.  Acquirers experienced statistically insignificant efficiency losses following 
the merger.  However, large size acquirers maintained superior efficiency relative to their peers.  
Small merging banks, on the other hand, experienced statistically significant efficiency losses 
after the merger relative to their peers.  Small merging acquirers ranked lower than their peers in 
efficiency by the fourth year following the merger. 
Furthermore, we decomposed cost efficiency for each year following the merger to 
investigate the source of higher cost, revenue, and profit efficiencies of acquirers.  The findings 
show that the pricing of acquirers’ inputs and outputs is the main source of cost efficiency rather 
than scale efficiency (being closer to the efficient frontier).  The results further show that 
acquirers gain their pricing advantage from their higher allocative efficiency (which indicates 
better management). 
To compare the market reaction results with our efficiency changes, we investigated the 
profit efficiency dynamics of our nine merger combinations for four years following the merger.  
The results show that LELE mergers experienced significant 3% efficiency gains four years 
 following the merger event.  On the other extreme, HELE mergers experienced a significant 47% 
loss four years follow the merger event.  
Summarizing, the results suggest that value-maximizing mergers are mostly large in size 
and match banks with clear chances to increase their future efficiency rankings.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 VI.  MARKET REACTION OF ACQUIRERS AND TARGETS UPON MERGER ANNOUNCEMENT 
6.1.  Introduction 
Considering the puzzling results of prior event studies around mergers, this dissertation 
attempts to introduce a more consistent explanation of the merger effect on the wealth of the 
acquiring and target banks’ shareholders.  Motivated by the works of Shafer (1993), Berger and 
Humphrey (1992), and more recently, by Rhodes et al. (2004), this dissertation utilizes the non-
parametric efficiency frontier for acquirers and targets in order to predict the market reaction 
more precisely depending on the profit efficiency pre-merger classification of targets and 
acquires. 
Table 25 lists our expectations concerning the market reaction to each merger 
combination.  It is apparent from the table that a merger between the most efficient banks is 
expected to produce positive returns to shareholders of both sides.  Taking into consideration our 
argument about the limited information asymmetry of “within” group mergers, we argue that all 
mergers located in any diagonal cell (1, 5, and 9) will yield positive abnormal returns for both 
parties.  Cells 2 and 3 show negative expected returns for acquirers combined with positive 
returns for targets.  Our expectations are predicated upon the findings of Berger and Humphrey 
(1992), Shafer (1993), and Akhavein (1997), who argue that efficiency gains are expected for the 
target when a more efficient bank acquires a less efficient bank.  Cells 4 and 7 show less certain 
expectations about the acquirer’s abnormal returns.  We believe that the relative size of the target 
to the bidder will determine the sign of the acquirer’s abnormal returns.  Rhodes et al. (2004) 
argues that when a less efficient acquirer merges with a more efficient target, the combined bank 
will experience efficiency gains.  On the other hand, we expect that target abnormal returns will 
be affected by the method of payment used.  Since we know that stock is mostly used in this kind  
 
 
 Table 25:  The Expected Market Reaction to Merger Announcements 
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             (LELE) 
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High efficiency/high efficiency (HEHE); high efficiency/medium efficiency (HEME); high efficiency/low 
efficiency (HELE); medium efficiency/high efficiency (MEHE); medium efficiency/medium efficiency (MEME); 
medium efficiency/low efficiency (MELE); low efficiency/high efficiency (LEHE); low efficiency/medium 
efficiency (LEME); and low efficiency/low efficiency (LELE). 
 
of merger, we argue that if the target (correctly) perceives an inefficiency signal from the 
acquirer, the target’s abnormal returns will be negative when equity is used.  We also expect the 
bidder’s abnormal returns to be negative. 
 
 
 
 6.2.  Methodology Used to Evaluate Market Reaction 
To test the market reaction to merger announcements, the event study methodology 
(Dodd and Warner, 1983) is used to determine whether the market is able to identify the 
efficiency characteristics of the acquirer and the target.  Following Delong (2001), the market 
model is estimated over a 300-day period ending 51 days before the announcement of the 
merger.  The CRSP equally weighted index will be used as a proxy for the market portfolio: 
 )( mtiiitit RbaRAR +−=  (8) 
where itAR represents the abnormal returns to bank stock i at time t, itR  represents the actual 
returns to bank stock i at time t, ia  is the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the intercept in 
the estimated market model, ib  is the OLS estimate of the slope coefficient market in the model 
which reflects the change in the market return relative to the return for bank i, and mtR  represents 
the actual returns to a market portfolio of bank stocks at time t.  As mentioned earlier, the market 
reaction will be applied to each of the nine groups.  To examine the factors that affect the 
abnormal return, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) will be calculated according to the 
following formula: 
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In keeping with the previous event study literature, we will use five event windows to calculate 
CAR:  (-1,1), one day before the merger announcement to one day after the merger 
announcement; (-5,5); (-10,10); (-15,15); and (-30,30).   
Finally, we will check the explanatory power of the efficiency scores of acquirers and 
targets by regressing them against CAR.  We include two other essential non-efficiency variables 
in our regression model.  The first is the method of payment used to pay for the merger 
 transaction.  Antoniou et al. (2005) find that cash acquirers continue to achieve positive 
significant abnormal returns in the three years following the merger.  The findings of Abhyankar 
et al. (2005) support cash over stock financing.  In this dissertation, however, we consider the 
possibility of a combination of cash and stocks in addition to cash-only and stock-only methods 
of payment.  Consequently, the method of payment here is not represented by a dummy variable, 
but by the percentage of cash used in the transaction.  The second non-efficiency variable 
included in our regression model is the relative size of the target.  James and Wier (1987) find 
that a merger between equals is positively related to the acquirer’s returns.  Delong (1999) finds 
that abnormal returns due to a merger announcement increase in relative size of target to bidder.  
We argue in this dissertation that the relative size of the target to bidder plays an important role 
in manipulating the market reaction to the merger announcement.  Again, this result can be 
explained by the expected efficiency that the target can pass to the acquirer (e.g., if an inefficient 
bank acquires an efficient bank of the same size, then we can argue that the target will pass 
efficiency to the combined firm, especially if it has a meaningful share in operating the combined 
bank’s operations ( see Rhodes et al., 2004). 
The final regression model for the acquirer is as follows: 
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where CARA is the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return.  TEA is the technical efficiency score 
of the acquirer and TET is the technical efficiency score of the target.  AEA and AET are the 
allocative efficiency scores of the acquirer and the target, respectively.  CEA and CET represent 
the cost efficiency of the acquirer and the target, respectively.  REA is the revenue efficiency of 
the acquitter and RET is the revenue efficiency of the target.  TA EandE ππ  are the profit 
 efficiencies of the acquirer and the target, respectively.  Pcash  is the portion paid by the 
acquirer in merger transaction.  Rsize is the size of the target relative to the bidder.  Finally, 
Geo_d is a dummy variable where intrastate mergers are assigned a value of zero and interstate 
mergers are assigned a value of one.  
The final regression model for the target is as follows: 
).11()_*()()(
)()()()()(
)()()()()(
131211
109876
54321
edGeoRsizePcash
EERERECE
CEAEAETETECAR
TATAT
ATATAT
++∗+∗
+∗+∗+∗+∗+∗
+∗+∗+∗+∗+∗+=
βββ
πβπββββ
βββββα
 
where CART is target’s cumulative abnormal returns.  TEA is the technical efficiency score of the 
acquirer and TET is the technical efficiency score of the target.  AEA and AET are the allocative 
efficiency scores of the acquirer and the target, respectively.  CEA and CET represent the cost 
efficiency of the acquirer and the target, respectively.  REA is the revenue efficiency of the 
acquirer and RET is the revenue efficiency of the target.  TA EandE ππ  are the profit efficiencies 
of the acquirer and the target, respectively.  Pcash  is the percentage of the target purchase price 
paid in cash by the acquirer.  Rsize  is the size of the target relative to the acquirer.  Finally, 
Geo_d is a dummy variable where intrastate mergers are assigned a value of zero and interstate 
mergers are assigned a value of one.  
To test for significance, we use the Z-statistics described by Dodd and Warner (1983).  
This test statistic has a normal distribution, with values ranging from zero to one.  Our null 
hypothesis is that there are no abnormal returns resulting from a merger announcement for either 
the acquirer or the target. 
To examine whether the differences between various types of mergers are statistically 
significant, we use the t-statistic, which measures the statistical difference between the means of 
 the two groups.  The t-statistic divides the difference in means by a control for the variance of 
the CARs and the size of the groups being examined as follows: 
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where ix  is the mean of each sub-sample i, iv  is the variance of sample i, and in  is the size of 
sample i.  Under the null hypothesis of no difference in the abnormal returns of both groups, the 
t-statistic is distributed as a Student-t.  Furthermore, the Wilcoxon signed rank non-parametric 
test is used as an alternative to the standard t-test in order to indicate whether the median is 
statistically different from zero.  Nonparametric tests do not require any assumptions regarding 
the distribution of the data.9  To apply the Wilcoxon test, we perform the bootstrapping 
technique by choosing 65,000 samples of each efficiency subgroup, where each sample consists 
of 50% of each efficiency subgroup.  Because some efficiency subgroups have so little 
observations (MELE and LEHE), we excluded them from this test where we compared each 
subgroup’s CARs with the joint CARs of the whole sample of targets and acquirers separately.  
This comparison is made possible because the distributional characteristics of targets and 
acquirers look asymptotically normal around the means (see Appendix A). 
6.3.  The Empirical Results 
6.3.1.  Acquirers’ Market Reaction 
       Tables 26 and 27 show the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) upon announcement of 309 
bank mergers for acquirers and targets.  We report CARs for nine windows:  (0, -1), (-1, 1), (-5, 
5), (-10, 10), (-15, 15), (-20, 20), (-25, 25), and (-30, 30).  Table 26 shows that, in general, 
                                                 
9 Holding the sample size constant, the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis is higher than the comparable 
nonparametric test.  
 acquirers experienced significant losses over all windows.  On average, acquirers lost 1.5%.  
LELE mergers experienced positive CARs.  This merger combination is the only one that 
experienced persistent positive CARs ten days after the merger ((-10, 10) window).  The results 
for this merger combination are consistent with the operating performance results discussed in 
Section 5.5, where we found that this merger combination is the only combination to experience 
profit efficiency gains. Consistent with the literature (Cornett, Hovakimian, Palia, and Tehranian 
(2003); Elyasiani and Deng (2004). Elyasiani and Deng (2004).), our results show that most 
acquirers experienced significant loss following the merger event. However, LELE mergers are 
the only who achieved significantly positive CARs which is a results not reported before where 
the classification used in this dissertation has never been used before. At the other extreme, we 
found that HEHE and HELE mergers experienced highly significant negative CARs.  The CARs 
of the (-30, 30) window show HEHE mergers experienced statistically significant 4.45% losses, 
which is higher than the CARs of the whole sample.  HELE mergers experienced the highest 
significant loss of 4.7%.  These results are also consistent with the profit efficiency results, 
where we found that HEHE mergers lost about 47.2% four years following the merger.  These 
results show that the market could distinguish between merger deals according to their efficiency 
characteristics.  Investors reacted positively to LELE deals because this kind of merger can only 
result in efficiency gains at the merged bank in the post merger era.  So, the announcement of 
this type of merger is perceived as an attempt from the acquirer’s side to improve it’s poor 
efficiency. 
       HEHE merger deals reveal negative information for the stockholders because they recognize 
that there is little or no way for efficiency improvement even when the target is an efficient bank.    
This argument is further supported by our results in Section 5.1.1, where we found that targets 
mostly depend on traditional banking activities and acquirers tend to depend more on other 
 investment schemes.  HELE deals further support our argument that the market can distinguish 
between merger deals according to their profit efficiency characteristics. Stockholders react 
negatively to HELE deals because acquirers can only lose efficiency when targets are inefficient.  
This result is supported by the fact that this type of merger experienced the worst declines in 
efficiency and stock prices.  We argue that the market perceives LELE mergers as value 
maximizing and the other two types of mergers as value destroying. 
       Consistent with Delong (1999,2000), the results show that the sub-sampling methodology 
could indicate that some mergers in banking are motivated by value maximizing objective while 
the majority of these mergers could be explained by the surplus cash theory which suggests that 
managers seek mergers to use the access cash they have. In addition gaining more market share/ 
power could be the reason behind the majority of merger deals. 
These puzzling results are discussed by Rholdes-Kropf et.al. (2004) who argue that value-
maximizing, but low-skilled managers of low valued firms acquire managerial talent from 
outside. They further argue that mangers acquire higher value targets as a way of further 
entrenching themselves.  
        Finally, we used the bootstrapping technique to clarify the distributional differences 
between merger combinations.  We iterated CARs of each merger combination 65,000 times to 
choose samples of 50% of each merger combination.  The results are presented in Panel A of 
Table 27.  Generally, the results show that each merger pair has its own characteristics. 
 Table 26:  Acquirer’s Market Reaction by Profit Efficiency Pair-wise Merger Combination 
 
 Acquirers   0-1 -1-1 -5-5 -10-10 -15-15 -20-20 -25-25 -30-30 
HEHE Mean -0.0245b -0.0003 -0.0362b -0.0367b -0.0386b -0.0497b -0.0545a -0.0445b 
HEHE Variance 0.0025 0.0002 0.0078 0.0102 0.0101 0.0108 0.01 0.01 
HELE Mean -0.0029 0.0021 -0.0114 -0.0099 -0.0206 -0.0255 -0.0232 -0.0470c 
HELE Variance 0.0012 0.0002 0.0023 0.0117 0.0119 0.0141 0.0169 0.0225 
HEME Mean -0.0152a -0.0018 -0.0182b -0.0277b -0.0335b -0.0311c -0.0174 -0.028 
HEME Variance 0.0009 0.0003 0.0033 0.0086 0.011 0.0194 0.0224 0.0268 
LEHE Mean 0.0252 0.029 0.0512 -0.0024 0.0061 0.0249 0.0768b 0.0347 
LEHE Variance 0.0017 0.0012 0.0083 0.0059 0.0027 0.0013 0.0038 0.0094 
LELE Mean -0.005 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0158c 0.0346b 0.0308b 0.0364b 0.0350b 
LELE Variance 0.0015 0.0003 0.0022 0.0044 0.0075 0.0078 0.0116 0.0167 
LEME Mean -0.0149 -0.0093 -0.0127 -0.0452 -0.0244 -0.0419 -0.044 -0.0547c 
LEME Variance 0.0026 0.0023 0.0102 0.0173 0.0118 0.0143 0.0211 0.0162 
MEHE Mean -0.0015 0.013 0.009 0.0109 0.0107 -0.0097 -0.0148 0.004 
MEHE Variance 0.0003 0.0008 0.0005 0.0025 0.0061 0.0103 0.0154 0.0116 
MELE Mean -0.0207a -0.0047b -0.0270a -0.0280a -0.0320a -0.0286a -0.0234b -0.0251b 
MELE Variance 0.0017 0.0004 0.0027 0.0049 0.0087 0.0116 0.0139 0.0156 
MEME Mean -0.0072b -0.0061a -0.0106b -0.0111c -0.0109c -0.0177b -0.0157c -0.0208b 
MEME Variance 0.0013 0.0004 0.0022 0.0046 0.0065 0.0088 0.0105 0.0137 
                    
mean   -0.0121 -0.003 -0.0155 -0.0165 -0.0164 -0.0197 -0.0157 -0.0204 
variance   0.0015 0.0004 0.0031 0.0064 0.0087 0.0114 0.0139 0.0166 
z-score   -5.6424 -2.6289 -4.9828 -3.6885 -3.1468 -3.2864 -2.3756 -2.8304 
                    
a: Statistically significant at 1% 
b: Statistically significant at 5% 
c: Statistically significant at 10% 
 
 
 
 Table 27:  The Distributional Characteristics of Targets and Acquirers (Bootstrapping 
Technique) 
   
Panel A. Acquirers distributional characteristics. 
Acquirers all HEHE HELE HEME LELE MELE MEME 
Mean -0.0149 -0.0355 -0.0109 -0.0187 0.0026 -0.0305 -0.01 
Percentile 2.5% -0.0214 -0.0689 -0.0292 -0.0365 -0.0163 -0.0436 -0.0194 
Percentile 97.5% -0.0085 -0.0006 0.0075 -0.0009 0.0214 -0.0172 -0.0004 
Median -0.0149 -0.0357 -0.011 -0.0188 0.0026 -0.0305 -0.01 
Sdev 0.0033 0.0173 0.0094 0.0091 0.0096 0.0068 0.0048 
1st Quartile -0.0171 -0.0473 -0.0173 -0.0249 -0.0039 -0.035 -0.0132 
3 Quartile -0.0127 -0.024 -0.0046 -0.0126 0.0091 -0.0259 -0.0067 
                
 
Panel B. targets distributional characteristics. 
Targets all HEHE HELE HEME LELE MELE MEME 
Mean 0.1621 0.1134 0.2357 0.1313 0.2211 0.1944 0.0949 
Percentile 2.5% 0.1415 0.0572 0.1314 0.0894 0.1447 0.1513 0.0655 
Percentile 97.5% 0.1834 0.1717 0.3501 0.1758 0.3068 0.2397 0.1255 
Median 0.162 0.1128 0.2341 0.131 0.2195 0.194 0.0946 
Sdev 0.0107 0.0292 0.0558 0.0221 0.0413 0.0226 0.0153 
1st Quartile 0.1548 0.0934 0.197 0.1161 0.1925 0.1789 0.0844 
3 Quartile 0.1692 0.133 0.272 0.1461 0.248 0.2094 0.1051 
                
 
6.3.2.  Targets’ Market Reaction 
       Table 28 shows the CARs of targets in our sample.  As documented in the literature, all 
targets experienced statistically significant CARs following the merger announcement for all 
windows.  On average, targets experienced 15.6% CARs.  HEHE merger announcements 
signaled negative wealth changes for acquiring bank shareholders as well as the smallest positive  
wealth changes for target bank shareholders among the efficiency combinations.  The 
explanation presented in the previous section still holds, target bank shareholders recognize the 
negative effects of re-allocating resources within the new merged bank, especially since most 
merger deals are stock-for-stock mergers in which the target bank’s shareholders still have future 
 cash flows to worry about.  The results also show that the best merger deal for targets are the 
ones that match low efficiency acquirers with medium efficiency targets (LEME).  Finally, the 
bootstrapping technique is used to show the distributional differences between merger 
combinations.  The results are presented in Panel B of Table 27.  The results show that each 
merger pair has its own characteristics. Our results are consistent with the evidence of the 
existence of significantly positive CARs for target’s shareholders reported by Cornett, 
Hovakimian, Palia, and Tehranian (2003),  Elyasiani and Deng (2004), DeLong (1999), DeLong 
(2001) and  Amihud et al. (2002). 
 
6.3.3.  The Total Wealth Effect of Each Merger Combination 
  In this section, we use the results of the last two sections to investigate the total wealth 
effect of each merger combination.  We estimate the wealth effect by multiplying the market 
capitalization of acquiring and target banks by average CARs of both sides divided by the total 
market capitalization.  We use the CARs of the (-30, 30) window.  The results are presented in 
Table 29.  The results show that LELE mergers experienced the highest wealth increases, HEHE 
mergers ranked second, and LEHE mergers ranked fourth.  On average, the mergers created 
2.25% positive returns for both parties.  
 
6.3.4.  The Cross-Sectional Analysis of Market Reaction 
In this section, we present the cross-sectional analysis of market reaction for the 
combined sample.  The dependent variable in all regression sets is the CARs of the whole sample 
for the (-5, 5) window.  The results are presented in Tables 30 and 31.  Table 30 shows five  
 
 
 Table 28:  Target’s Market Reaction by Profit Efficiency Pair-wise Merger Combination 
 
Targets   0-1 -1-1 -5-5 -10-10 -15-15 -20-20 -25-25 -30-30 
HEHE mean 0.0922 0.0059 0.12 0.1261 0.1409 0.1389 0.1293 0.1313 
HEHE Variance 0.0058 0.0006 0.016 0.0178 0.0162 0.0206 0.0251 0.026 
HELE mean 0.1969 0.0819 0.2262 0.2375 0.2429 0.228 0.2491 0.2468 
HELE Variance 0.0472 0.0389 0.0577 0.0625 0.0523 0.0538 0.0637 0.0694 
HEME mean 0.121 0.0432 0.142 0.1551 0.1673 0.1768 0.1694 0.1702 
HEME Variance 0.0172 0.0118 0.0171 0.0167 0.0196 0.0251 0.0291 0.0349 
LEHE mean 0.1763 0.141 0.1627 0.2001 0.2296 0.2339 0.2473 0.2393 
LEHE Variance 0.0082 0.0104 0.008 0.014 0.0124 0.0225 0.0133 0.0078 
LELE mean 0.1974 0.0192 0.22 0.2275 0.2245 0.2346 0.2332 0.2307 
LELE Variance 0.0476 0.0042 0.0496 0.0499 0.0621 0.0589 0.0592 0.0616 
LEME mean 0.2119 0.0912 0.2124 0.2201 0.2787 0.2757 0.288 0.3099 
LEME Variance 0.121 0.0772 0.13 0.108 0.1064 0.1528 0.1974 0.2212 
MEHE mean 0.1501 0.0907 0.1536 0.1597 0.1438 0.1403 0.1441 0.1813 
MEHE Variance 0.021 0.0008 0.0136 0.0103 0.0122 0.0104 0.0192 0.0517 
MELE mean 0.1858 0.0342 0.2097 0.2149 0.2277 0.2266 0.2301 0.24 
MELE Variance 0.0239 0.0095 0.0274 0.0295 0.0303 0.0359 0.0401 0.043 
MEME mean 0.1034 0.028 0.0982 0.1078 0.1029 0.1165 0.1188 0.1269 
MEME Variance 0.02 0.0084 0.0213 0.0285 0.0339 0.0397 0.0419 0.0488 
                    
mean   0.1476 0.038 0.1612 0.17 0.1764 0.1811 0.1832 0.1896 
variance   0.0289 0.0135 0.0329 0.0352 0.0384 0.0431 0.0484 0.0539 
z-score   15.7309 5.7474 16.127 16.4333 16.2967 15.7886 15.0508 14.7638 
                    
* All mean values are statistically significant at 1% level. 
 
 
 
 Table 29:  The Combined Wealth Effect of Profit Efficiency Pair-wise Merger 
Combinations 
  
 Mean Variance Z- value 
HEHE 0.0549 0.0198 1.8708 
HELE 0.0023 0.0014 0.3001 
HEME -0.0043 0.0013 -0.7442 
LEHE 0.0256 0.0007 1.7345 
LELE 0.1730 0.2479 1.9660 
LEME -0.1205 0.2420 -0.7346 
MEHE 0.0244 0.0005 3.1072 
MELE 0.0252 0.0065 2.7463 
MEME 0.0220 0.0051 3.0113 
 
regression frameworks, where the dependent variable is the CARs of targets.  Regression 1 is the 
most comprehensive since all explanatory variables are included.  The results indicate that the 
relative size and revenue efficiency of the targets are negatively correlated with the CARs of the 
targets and significantly different from zero at 5% level.  However, both variables remained 
significant through Regression 3.  Regressions 4 and 5 show that the acquirers’ profit efficiency 
is significantly and positively related to the CARs of targets.  In other words, the higher the 
profit efficiency of the acquirer, the higher the CAR of the target.  However, the highest R2 is 
associated with the first regression, and at 23%,  is higher than similar regressions reported in the 
previous literature (see Delong, 2001). 
Table 31 shows the results of the same regression framework using the CARs of 
acquirers rather than targets.  The results show that the technical efficiency of the acquirers is 
positively related to their CARs.  The higher the ability of the acquirer to maximize its output 
quantity for a given level of inputs, the higher is the market return.  So, any additional resources 
the acquirer acquires will be used to maximize output levels.  Inconsistent with Delong (1999 
and 2001), geographic diversification is positively related to market returns.  Finally, and 
 consistent with the most recent literature, the stock portion used in merger deals is negatively 
related to the CARS of acquirers. 
Table 30:  Regression Frameworks Used to Explain the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of 
Targets Upon Merger Announcement 
 
 Efficiency Regression 1  Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
C     0.4889 0.4004c 0.1582a 0.5144b 0.3615a 
 (.124) (.080) (.000) (.038) (.000)   
Profit 0.1768   0.3117a 0.2935b 
 (.167)   (.009) (.013)   
Revenue 0.1127   -0.0957 -0.0555 
 (.310)   (.321) (.516)   
Cost 0.1779   0.2201 -0.0431 
 (.460)   (.359) (.601)   
Technical 0.2526   -0.1142  
 (.516)   (.770)  
Pure Technical -0.7032b   -0.5978 -0.3946b 
 (.067)   (.131) (.003)   
Allocative -0.0946   -0.1996  
 (.476)   (.133)  
Scale   -0.0402   -0.0030  
A
cq
ui
re
r’s
 
 (.870)   (.991)  
GEO   0.0293 0.0270 0.0301   
 (.109) (.135) (.115)   
REL   -0.0724b -0.0733b -0.1053a   
 (.036) (.029) (.003)   
STOCK 0.0182 0.0274 0.0021   
 
 (.516) (.323) (.942)   
Profit -0.0447 -0.0293   -0.0410 
 (.708) (.790)   (.566)   
Revenue -0.2711b -0.2364b    
 (.019) (.020)    
Cost -0.3219 -0.4299b   -0.1262 
 (.140) (.046)   (.101)   
Technical -0.2597 -0.1021    
 (.477) (.780)    
Pure Technical 0.5623 0.4004    
 (.117) (.265)    
Allocative 0.0229 0.0602    
 (.837) (.583)    
Scale   -0.1271 -0.2288    
Ta
rg
et
’s
 
 (.598) (.345)    
 R2 0.2296 0.1854 0.0481 0.1156 0.1249 
       
 
 
 Table 31:  Regression Frameworks Used to Explain the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of 
Acquirers Upon Merger Announcement 
 
Ac Efficiency  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
C     0.1057 0.0283 0.0038 0.0717 -0.0182c 
 (.157) (.594) (.586)  (.210)   (.052) 
Profit -0.0187   -0.0333 -0.0450 
 (.535)   (.225)   (.100) 
Revenue 0.0410   -0.0056 -0.0014 
 (.117)   (.801)   (.942) 
Cost -0.0179   0.0359 0.0341 
 (.751)   (.518)   (.077) 
Technical 0.2014b   0.1559c  
 (.028)   (.085)    
Pure Technical -0.1654c   -0.1271 0.0052 
 (.066)   (.165)   (.865) 
Allocative 0.0287   0.0008  
 (.359)   (.979)    
Scale   -0.1172b   -0.1013c  
A
cq
ui
re
r’s
 
 (.043)   (.082)    
GEO   0.0078c 0.0071c 0.0075c   
 (.069) (.094) (.072)    
REL   0.0038 -0.0005 0.0008   
 (.639) (.945) (.914)    
STOCK -0.0224a -0.0251a -0.0265a   
 
 (.001) (.000) (.000)    
Profit 0.0110 -0.0022   0.0195 
 (.694) (.933)   (.243) 
Revenue -0.0363 -0.0111    
 (.181) (.638)    
Cost 0.0562 0.0606   0.0016 
 (.273) (.227)   (.929) 
Technical -0.0267 0.0029    
 (.756) (.973)    
Pure Technical 0.0042 -0.0253    
 (.960) (.762)    
Allocative -0.0350 -0.0262    
 (.182) (.304)    
Scale   -0.0109 -0.0148    
Ta
rg
et
’s
 
 (.847) (.793)    
 R2 0.1389 0.1045 0.0897 0.0408 0.0381 
       
 
 
 
 
        6.4.  Conclusions 
   We investigate the market reaction upon merger announcement of nine profit efficiency 
pair-wise merger combinations.  Our findings show that mergers combining low efficiency 
acquirers and targets create significant market returns following the merger event, while mergers 
combining high efficiency parties destroy the acquirer’s wealth more than any other type of 
merger.  Medium efficiency merger parties experienced the lowest market returns for all 
windows, while low efficiency mergers experienced the fourth best among the efficiency 
combinations. 
Our findings further show that acquirers generally lost about 2% of their wealth upon 
merger announcement.  Consistent with the literature, targets experienced, on average, 15.5% 
significant market returns following the merger announcement.  
  From the total wealth effect perspective, our overall results show that low efficiency 
merger combinations left both parties with the highest returns (around 17.3%), followed by 
mergers between high efficiency parties (5%).  On the other extreme, LEME and HEME 
combinations destroyed the overall mergers values by 12.05% and 0.04%, respectively.  
Generally, mergers left both parties with a 2.2% average market return.   
 We further performed the cross-sectional analysis of our combined sample.  The findings 
show that CARs of acquirers are positively related to their technical efficiency and geographic 
diversification.  This result indicates that acquirers are able to access new markets and better 
manage and invest the new resources acquired from targets.  We further find that targets’ CARs 
are negatively related to relative target size and revenue efficiency. 
Finally, by combining our results in Section 5 with the market reaction results, we argue 
that the market can distinguish the profit efficiency characteristics of acquirers and targets and 
 the consequent changes on the future cash flows of each merger deal.  This result strongly 
supports the efficient markets hypothesis.        
 
 VII. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
 
Applying the non-parametric data envelopment approach, we estimated the cost, revenue, 
and profit efficiency scores of merging and non-merging U.S. banks over the time period from 
1992 to 2003.  On average, acquirers have 1.65% and 2% cost efficiency advantages over targets 
and non-merging banks, respectively.  To understand the source of this advantage, we 
decomposed the cost efficiency into its technical, pure technical, scale, and allocative efficiency 
components.  We found that allocative efficiency is the main source of the higher cost efficiency 
of acquirers over their peers, especially during the 1990s. 
We further investigated the post-merger efficiency dynamics for the four years following 
the merger event.  Acquirers experienced statistically insignificant efficiency losses following 
the merger.  However, large size acquirers maintained superior efficiency relative to their peers.  
Small merging banks, on the other hand, experienced statistically significant efficiency losses 
after the merger relative to their peers.  Small merging acquirers ranked lower than their peers in 
efficiency by the fourth year following the merger. 
Furthermore, we decomposed cost efficiency for each year following the merger to 
investigate the source of higher cost, revenue, and profit efficiencies of acquirers.  The findings 
show that the pricing of acquirers’ inputs and outputs is the main source of cost efficiency rather 
than scale efficiency (being closer to the efficient frontier).  The results further show that 
acquirers gain their pricing advantage from their higher allocative efficiency (which indicates 
better management). 
To compare the market reaction results with our efficiency changes, we investigated the 
profit efficiency dynamics of our nine merger combinations for four years following the merger.  
The results show that LELE mergers experienced significant 3% efficiency gains four years 
 following the merger event.  On the other extreme, HELE mergers experienced a significant 47% 
loss four years follow the merger event.  
We investigate the market reaction upon merger announcement of nine profit efficiency 
pair-wise merger combinations.  Our findings show that mergers combining low efficiency 
acquirers and targets create significant market returns following the merger event, while mergers 
combining high efficiency parties destroy the acquirer’s wealth more than any other type of 
merger.  Medium efficiency merger parties experienced the lowest market returns for all 
windows, while low efficiency mergers experienced the fourth best among the efficiency 
combinations. 
Our findings further show that acquirers generally lost about 2% of their wealth upon 
merger announcement.  Consistent with the literature, targets experienced, on average, 15.5% 
significant market returns following the merger announcement.  
  From the total wealth effect perspective, our overall results show that low efficiency 
merger combinations left both parties with the highest returns (around 17.3%), followed by 
mergers between high efficiency parties (5%).  On the other extreme, LEME and HEME 
combinations destroyed the overall mergers values by 12.05% and 0.04%, respectively.  
Generally, mergers left both parties with a 2.2% average market return.   
 We further performed the cross-sectional analysis of our combined sample.  The findings 
show that CARs of acquirers are positively related to their technical efficiency and geographic 
diversification.  This result indicates that acquirers are able to access new markets and better 
manage and invest the new resources acquired from targets.  We further find that targets’ CARs 
are negatively related to relative target size and revenue efficiency. 
Summing-up, the results suggest that value-maximizing mergers are mostly large in size 
and match banks with clear chances to increase their future efficiency rankings 
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Appendix A: The CARs distributional characteristics of acquirers and targets.  
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